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SUMMARY: In the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, European States have pushed for tighter migration 
control policies by, inter alia, extending and toughening the practice of detaining asylum-seekers. The aim 
of this study is to assess how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) constrains this worrisome 
practice. Does it grant States the same margin of appreciation as in other migration-related judgments, or 
does it adopt a more active role in protecting asylum-seekers’ right to liberty? To answer this question, this 
study analyses the case law of the ECtHR after 2015 on the subject and evaluates it in the light of the 
relevant international human rights treaties, European Union law and scholarly opinion. In doing so, it 
especially seeks to identify any changes in the Court´s case law that might indicate a reaction of the 
Strasbourg Court to the political tensions of the refugee crisis. 
 
 
RESUMEN: Como respuesta a la crisis de refugiados de 2015, los Estados europeos han impulsado políticas 
más estrictas de controles migratorios, entre otros, extendiendo y endureciendo la práctica de detener a 
solicitantes de asilo. El objetivo de este estudio es evaluar cómo el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos 
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Humanos (TEDH) limita esta preocupante práctica. ¿Otorga a los Estados el mismo margen de 
apreciación que en otras sentencias relativas a las migraciones, o adopta un papel más activo en la 
protección del derecho a la libertad de los solicitantes de asilo? Para responder a esta pregunta, el 
presente trabajo analiza la jurisprudencia del TEDH después de 2015 en esta materia y la evalúa a la luz 
de los tratados de derechos humanos pertinentes, el Derecho de la Unión Europea y la doctrina. En esta 
labor, el estudio trata especialmente de identificar cambios en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal que indiquen 
una reacción de Estrasburgo a las tensiones políticas derivadas de la crisis de refugiados.   
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The right to liberty of the person is one of the foundational pillars of human rights regimes 
around the world. Its origins can be traced back to the English Magna Carta Libertatum 
of 1215, and the emergence of the modern State is inconceivable without it. Nonetheless, 
despite its paramount importance for every human being,1 States seem to be more readily 
prepared to restrict the right to liberty of migrants than that of nationals. In effect, 
particularly since the turn of the century, detaining migrants has become a “routine rather 
than exceptional practice”2 through which States seek to control irregular migration, 
respond to mounting political pressures and maintain and assert their territorial authority.3 
Detention of migrants without a punitive purpose –i.e. detention that falls outside the 
 
* All referenced websites were consulted for the last time on the 13th of January 2020. 
1 In modern human rights declarations, the importance of the right to liberty was recognized in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (Article 2), the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 
1776 (Section 1) and, at the universal level, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 3 and 
9). 
2 UNHCR, Beyond Detention. A Global Strategy to support governments to end the detention of asylum-
seekers and refugees, 2014. Available at: https://cutt.ly/4rxlt7B. Worrisome immigration detention 
practices in different countries have made headlines in 2019. See for instance as regards the United States: 
CNN, “This year saw the most people in immigration detention since 2001”, 12-11-2018. Available at: 
https://cutt.ly/Urxleeu; and as regards Spain: El Diario.es, “El nuevo centro de migrantes del puerto de 
Málaga dedica 2,3 m2 por persona, la mitad que un calabozo para detenidos”, 28-07-2019. Available at:  
https://cutt.ly/2rWkMam.  
3 SAMPSON, R. and MITCHELL, G., “Global Trends in Immigration Detention and Alternatives to 
Detention: Practical, Political and Symbolic Rationales”, Journal on Migration and Human Security, vol. 
1, n. 3, 2013, pp. 291-305; DUSKOVÁ, S., “Migration Control and Detention of Migrants and Asylum 
Seekers –Motivations, Rationale and Challenges”, Groningen Journal of International Law, n. 5, 2017, pp. 
23-33, p. 25. Global statistics on immigration detention can be found in the websites of the Global Detention 
Project and the International Detention Coalition: https://cutt.ly/vrxlrzW and https://cutt.ly/ArxlrK8. 
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ambit of criminal law– is often referred to as “administrative detention”, although it can 
either be ordered or applied by the State administration or by a court.4 
 
The international community has expressed the concerns of political and civil actors over 
this practice in a soft law document, namely the Global Compact for Migration.5 In 
Objective 13 of the Compact, States commit to “use immigration detention only as a 
measure of last resort” and to “work towards alternatives”. Moreover, the United Nations 
Committee on Migrant Workers is in the process of drafting a General Comment on 
Migrant´s Rights to Liberty and Freedom from Arbitrary Detention,6 which reinforces the 
inclusion of the issue of immigration detention on the international political agenda. 
 
Among the migrants being detained, some are people who have been forced to flee their 
home countries and are in search of international protection. This practice is particularly 
troublesome, since detention causes an “independent deterioration of the mental health of 
people who are already highly traumatised”, as an empirical study has shown.7 Detaining 
asylum-seekers exposes them to a high risk of re-traumatisation and reduces the future 
prospect of successful adaptation and eventual integration in the host society.8 
 
In the European context, the use of detention as part of migration policies in recent years 
is very much linked to European State´s “improvised response”9 to the unprecedented 
levels of migrants and asylum-seekers that the continent faced in 2015 which was named 
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “the year of Europe´s 
Refugee Crisis”.10 Although as far back as in 2003 Goodwin-Gill warned of the need to 
maintain accurate records of all cases where refugees and asylum-seekers are detained,11 
data collection and publication by States on this issue remains very scarce in the European 
 
4 GOODWIN-GILL, “Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: non-
penalization, detention, and protection”, in FELLER, E., TÜRK, V. and NICHOLSON, F. (eds.), Refugee 
Protection in International Law. UNHCR´s Global Consultations on International Protection, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 232. 
5 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, United Nations General Assembly, 19 
December 2018 (Res. A/73/195). This is the first international agreement to regulate human mobility at the 
global level. See FAJARDO DEL CASTILLO, T., “El Pacto Mundial por una Migración Segura, Ordenada 
y Regular: un Instrumento de Soft Law para una Gestión de la Migración que Respete los Derechos 
Humanos”, Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, n. 38, 2019, pp. 1-34; and VITIELLO, D., “Il 
Contributo Dell’unione Europea Alla Governance Internazionale dei Flussi di Massa di Rifugiati e 
Migranti: Spunti per una Rilettura Critica Dei Global Compacts”, Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 
n.3, 2018, pp. 1-44. 
6 Draft General Comment No. 5 on Migrants’ Rights to Liberty and Freedom from Arbitrary Detention, 
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and members of Their Families, 2019. 
The concept note of the Draft is available at: https://cutt.ly/Srxlymd. 
7 FILGES, T., MONTGOMERY, E., KASTRUP, M., “The Impact of Detention on the Health of Asylum 
Seekers: A Systematic Review”, Research on Social Work Practice, vol. 1, n. 16, 2015, p. 13. 
8 ILAREVA, V., “Detention of asylum seekers: interaction between the Return and Reception Conditions 
Directives in Bulgaria”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy [blog], 25-11-2015. Available at: 
https://cutt.ly/rrxluhf. 
9 VAN MIDDELAAR, Alarums and Excursions: Improvising Politics on the European Stage, Agenda 
Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2019. 
10 UNHCR, “2015: The year of Europe´s refugee crisis”, 8-12-2015. Available at: https://cutt.ly/krxluL7. 
11 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 238. 
[39] REVISTA ELECTRÓNICA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (2020) 
- 4 - DOI: 10.17103/reei.39.10 
continent.12 But despite the lack of official statistics, non-governmental organizations 
show that the detention of asylum-seekers is a highly visible problem in several European 
countries. A recent report proves that the use of detention of asylum-seekers has increased 
since 2015 in four Member States of the European Union (EU),13 and it is equally 
troubling to see reports of practices in non-EU Member States such as Turkey and North 
Macedonia, where asylum-seekers are held in overcrowded conditions and unlawfully 
detained.14 
 
The Council of Europe has not remained silent on this issue. After the new wave of 
detention practices in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, it has adopted a “five step 
plan to abolish migrant detention”15 and is working on a codifying instrument of European 
rules on the administrative detention of migrants.16 For the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT), immigration detention is also a primary focus of its work.17 
 
It is in this context that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or “the Court”) has 
been called to action in order to protect asylum-seekers´ right to liberty under Article 
5(1)(f) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)18, as well as their right to 
dignity under Article 3 ECHR in situations where asylum-seekers have faced appalling 
conditions of detention. Although the original role of the ECtHR was to provide remedies 
in individual cases, the Court has long been dealing with systematic violations of human 
rights in general terms, setting human rights standards and thus acquiring a constitutional 
 
12 AIDA, Asylum Statistics in the European Union: A Need for Numbers, 2015, p. 7. Available at: 
https://cutt.ly/lrxliwF; ACCESS INFO EUROPE and GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, The Uncounted: 
Detention of Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Europe, 2015. Available at: https://cutt.ly/8rxlizP. 
13 By way of illustration: In Hungary, more than 70% of asylum-seekers in 2017 were de facto detained in 
the “transit zones” under appalling conditions such as food deprivation; in Bulgaria, access to the asylum 
procedure is not automatic upon submission of the asylum application (as required by EU law) and thus 
asylum-seekers who have entered the country irregularly are immediately detained for the purpose of 
removal; in Italy, detention upon arrival after 2015 has occurred through detention in the hotspots, 
administrative detention in pre-removal centres and de facto detention on boats; and in Greece, legal 
uncertainty prevails regarding detention in the context of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. 
See HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE, Crossing a Red Line. How EU Countries Undermine the 
Right to Liberty by Expanding the Use of Detention of Asylum Seekers upon Entry, 2019. Available at: 
https://cutt.ly/drxloyS. See also ILAREVA, supra note 8; and MAJCHER, I., “The EU Hotspot Approach: 
Blurred Lines between Restriction on and Deprivation of Liberty (Part II)”, Border Criminologies [blog], 
05-04-2018. Available at: https://cutt.ly/RrW0YEG. 
14 AIDA, Place of Detention: Turkey, 2019. Available at: https://cutt.ly/IrxlsBr; Amnesty International, 
North Macedonia 2017/2018, 2018. Available at: https://cutt.ly/2rxlaDs. 
15 COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, “High time for states to invest in alternatives to migrant 
detention”, 31-01-2017. Available at: https://cutt.ly/lrxlspi. 
16 Codifying instrument of European rules on the administrative detention of migrants 1st Draft, European 
Committee on Legal Co-Operation (CDCJ), 18-05-2017. See MCGREGOR, L., “An Appraisal of the 
Council of Europe’s Draft European Rules on the Conditions of Administrative Detention of Migrants”, 
EJIL-Talk! [blog], 19-07-2017. Available at: https://cutt.ly/RrlBrVI. 
17 CPT, Immigration Detention Factsheet, CPT/Inf(2017)3, 2017. Available at: https://cutt.ly/frxlf1G. 
18 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950 (CETS, 
No. 5) as amended by Protocol 14, 13 May 2004 (CETS, No. 194). 
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function.19 Through the lens of this constitutional role of the ECtHR, the first aim of this 
study is to systematize the jurisprudence of the Court from 2015 onwards regarding the 
detention of asylum-seekers20 in order to elucidate which are the current minimum human 
rights standards applicable in the “Council of Europe legal space”.21 
 
The second aim of the study is to evaluate the jurisprudence of the ECtHR regarding the 
detention of asylum seekers after the 2015 refugee crisis from the perspective of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine. The constitutional function of the ECtHR entails that the 
Court –like national constitutional courts22– has to consider the political consequences of 
its judgments, due to the fact that its decisions affect the political community as a whole. 
Since the 1970s,23 the ECtHR has given due regard to these political consequences by 
applying the margin of appreciation doctrine, according to which the Court gives some 
discretion to States in applying the Convention and only intervenes when it is absolutely 
necessary to do so.24 One of the main functions of this doctrine is to react to political 
pressures coming from States who do not wish to see the Court intervene in sensitive 
political issues.25 
 
Undoubtedly, migration is a burning political area in which States are very jealous of their 
sovereignty. Consequently, ever since the Abdulaziz judgment,26 the ECtHR has been 
 
19 HARMSEN, R., “The European Court of Human Rights as a ‘Constitutional Court’: Definitional Debates 
and the Dynamics of Reform”, in MORISON, J., MCEVOY, K. and ANTHONY, G., (eds.), Judges, 
Transition, and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 51. 
20 For this study, 30 judgments rendered between 2015 and 2019 which concern the detention of asylum-
seekers under Article 5(1)(f) have been drawn from the European Database of Asylum Law (EDAL), which 
is an online database managed by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). Due to the large 
number of judgments related to the detention of asylum-seekers compiled in this database, only those that 
concern EU Member States have been selected. This will allow us to analyse the interaction between the 
ECHR and EU law in the Court’s case law. Full judgments will only be quoted one time in the footnotes, 
and shorter versions will be used in the following citations of the same judgment. 
21 VON BOGDANDY, A., “The Transformation of European Law: The Reformed Concept and its Quest 
for Comparison”, MPIL Research Paper Series, n. 14, 2016.  
22 LARENZ, K. Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft. Springer, Heidelberg, 1979; HÄBERLE, P., 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zwischen Politik und Rechtswissenschaft, Athenaeum, Königstein, 1980; 
GARCÍA DE ENTERRIA,E., La Constitución como norma y el Tribunal Constitucional, Civitas, 
Madrid,1981, p. 180. 
23 Handyside v. Uk, no. 5493/72, ECtHR 7 December 1976. Previously, in Lawless v. Ireland, the European 
Commission had made reference to the margin of appreciation for the first time. See Lawless v. Ireland, 
no. 332/57, Report of the European Commission of Human Rights, 19 December 1959. 
24 HUTCHINSON, M. R., “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights”, 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 48 n.3, 1999, pp. 638-650. For a discussion on the 
importance of the doctrine, see also TULKENS, F. and DONNAY, L., “L’usage de la marge d’appréciation 
par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Paravent juridique superflu ou mécanisme indispensable 
par nature?”, Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Pénal Comparé, n. 1, 2006, pp.3-23. 
25 In his empirical study, Madsen proves that judicial actions of the ECtHR are reflective of socio-political 
transformations and political criticism. See MADSEN, M. R., “Rebalancing European Human Rights: Has 
the Brighton Declaration Engendered a New Deal on Human Rights in Europe?”, Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement, n. 9, pp. 199-222. 
26 In Abdulaziz, the Court laid down for the first time what has now become its mantra in migration-related 
cases: “as a matter of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the 
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very deferential to migration policies.27 The Court’s fear of upsetting State Parties has 
translated into tightly circumscribed rulings which exhibit a bias in favour of the State.28 
Within this theoretical framework, this study will critically assess whether the 
jurisprudence of the Court regarding the detention of asylum-seekers is also characterized 
by the self-restraint that it generally shows in migration-related cases and, if so, whether 
the political tensions of the refugee crisis have led the Court to be even more deferential 
to State’s detention practices. 
 
The study will focus on the requirements under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR as interpreted by 
the Court (sections II to V), though it will also touch upon the impact of the refugee crisis 
on the Court’s interpretation of the applicability of Article 5 in the Hungarian “transit 
zones” (section VI) and on its reading of Article 3 ECHR regarding conditions of 
detention of asylum-seekers (section VII).29 Throughout the study, the intertwining of the 
Strasbourg case law and with the broader international human rights framework and with 
EU law will also be present. With respect to the terminology, it is important to note that 
the term “asylum-seeker” will be used in a broad sense so as to refer to those persons 
applying for refugee status pursuant to the definition of a “refugee” in the Refugee 
Convention30 and to those seeking subsidiary protection, as well as to those persons 
whose application has been denied but who are exercising their right to an effective 
remedy (Article 13 ECHR in connection with Article 3). 
 
 
II. THE GROUNDS FOR DETENTION UNDER ARTICLE 5(1)(F) ECHR 
 
Within the European human rights system, the right to liberty finds its connection to 
migration control and migrants’ rights in Article 5(1)(f), which allows for the detention 
of migrants in certain cases. As noted by Costello, by putting immigration detention in a 
category of its own, the ECHR leaves this type of detention subject to looser standards of 
justification.31 Throughout this section it will be shown that the Court has used these 




right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory”. See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandi, no. 
9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81, ECHR 28 May 1985, §67.  
27 GUIRAUDON, V., “European Courts and Foreigner´s Rights: A Comparative Study of Norm Diffusion”, 
The International Migration Review, vol.34, n. 4, 2000, pp. 1088-1125. 
28 DEMBOUR, M. B., When Humans Become Migrants. Study of the European Court of Human Rights 
with an Inter-American Counterpoint, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. 
29 Besides the need to limit the scope of the study, the reason for this selection is that the case law of the 
Court regarding liberty-related rights (the right to a judicial review enshrined in Article 5(4) ECHR, the 
right to information of Article 5(2), the right to compensation of Article 5(5) and the right not to be 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in detention under Article 3) has been less controversial than 
that regarding the right to liberty itself and has thus not sparked such an interesting academic debate.  
30 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951 (U.N.T.S., vol. 189, p. 137) and 31 January 
1967 (U.N.T.S. vol. 606, p. 267). 
31 COSTELLO, C., “Immigration Detention: The Grounds Beneath Our Feet”, Current Legal Problems, n. 
68, 2015, pp. 143-177., p. 147. 
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1. Saadi v. UK Takes Hold: Asylum-seekers are still “Unauthorised Entrants” 
 
The first ground on which a State can detain a migrant under Article 5(1)(f) is “to prevent 
his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country”. With regard to asylum-seekers who 
enter a State party in an irregular manner, since 2015 the case law of the Court that began 
with Saadi v. UK32 has remained intact: “up to the decision on an asylum claim, such 
detention can be considered to fall under the first limb of Article 5(1)(f), namely to 
prevent effecting an unauthorised entry”.33 Therefore, the Court has accepted what has 
been termed “detention for administrative convenience”.34 
 
Indeed, from Saadi until today, what Dembour identified as the “Strasbourg reversal” in 
the migration-related case law of the Court regarding Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR35 has 
also taken hold of the Court’s interpretation of Article 5(1)(f). This means that, instead of 
starting with the principle that asylum-seekers are human beings entitled to their right to 
liberty, Strasbourg regards Article 5 as potentially limiting the “undeniable right of States 
to exercise sovereign control over the entry and residence of aliens on their territory”, a 
right of which “the ability to detain would-be migrants who have applied through an 
asylum application for permission to enter the country” is an “essential corollary”.36 
Because of this right to control, national law can decide the point at which an asylum-
seeker can be considered to have effected an “authorised entry” within the meaning of 
Article 5(1)(f). Only then will detention of an asylum-seeker cease to be permitted by the 
ECHR.37 
 
Several authors have underlined the legal fiction that has been created by the ECHR and 
by the Court through the use of the term “entry” in Article 5(1)(f). Battjes notes that, 
under Strasbourg law, the asylum-seeker is both in and not in the territory38. Indeed, there 
seems to be a contradiction in the sense that the State is required to regard the asylum-
seeker as being present in its territory for the purposes of non-refoulement (which 
suspends expulsion) but, at the same time, it may regard the asylum-seeker as not being 
present for the purposes of detention.39 This, in turn, entitles the State to detain the 
asylum-seeker to “prevent” the entry. For Costello, the Convention system creates a 
 
32 Saadi v. UK, no. 13229/03, ECtHR 29 January 2008. 
33 Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, nos. 25794/13 and 28151/13, ECtHR 22 November 2016, 
§141; O.M. v. Hungary, no. 9912/15, ECtHR 5 July 2016, §47; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, no. 56796/13, 
ECtHR 3 May 2016, §128; Mahamed Jama v. Malta, no. 10290/13, ECtHR 26 November 2015, §144; 
Nabil and Others v. Hungary, no. 62116/12, ECtHR 22 September 2015, §27. 
34 O’NIONS, H., “No Right to Liberty: The Detention of Asylum Seekers for Administrative Convenience”, 
European Journal of Migration and Law, n. 10, 2008; DE BRUYCKER, P. and TSOURDI, L., “The 
Challenge of Asylum Detention to Refugee Protection”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, n.35, 2016, pp. 1-6. 
35 DEMBOUR, supra note 28, p. 194. 
36 Thimothawes v. Belgium, no. 39061/11, ECtHR 4 April 2017, §58; J.R. and Others v. Greece, no. 
22696/16, ECtHR 25 January 2018, §108; Saadi v. UK, §64. 
37 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §59; Mahamed Jama v. Malta, §137-138. 
38 BATTJES, H., “Territoriality and Asylum Law: The Use of Territorial Jurisdiction to Circumvent Legal 
Obligations and Human Rights Law Responses”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 47, 
2017, pp. 263-286, p. 274. 
39 R.T. v. Greece, no. 5124/11, ECtHR 11 February 2016, §88; A.Y. v. Greece, no. 58399/11, ECtHR 5 
November 2015 §87. 
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fiction of non-presence that invites us to imagine the asylum-seeker as being kept 
“outside” the State40 and awaiting approval for his entry –a construction which, according 
to Moreno-Lax, is at odds with the principle of legal certainty.41 
 
However, the term “entry” in Article 5(1)(f) cannot be interpreted in isolation. It must be 
taken together with the term “unauthorised”, which is, in our view, the core concept of 
the first limb of Article 5(1)(f). From this perspective, the question to be addressed is the 
following: is it correct to regard as “unauthorised entrants” those individuals who have 
irregularly entered the State but whose asylum application has been formally registered 
in the asylum system? This section will argue that, to be in line with international law, 
the Court should develop a more nuanced case law which declares that asylum-seekers 
may only be detained for specific reasons before their application is registered, but once 
the application has entered the asylum system, asylum-seekers must be regarded as being 
authorised –and thus not liable to detention under Article 5(1)(f). As will be shown, the 
Court could easily find inspiration in several sources of international law for establishing 
such specific reasons that would justify asylum detention. In addition, EU law could also 
serve as a guideline for the Court, particularly the principle according to which “Member 
States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is an 
applicant”.42 
 
While it is for the Court to determine the meaning of the term “unauthorised”, it must be 
equally kept in mind that the ECHR does not apply in a vacuum but, rather, in conjunction 
with other international instruments for the protection of human rights.43 Article 31(3)(c) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties lays down that a treaty shall be 
interpreted in its context, taking into account “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties”.44 Since all State Parties to the ECHR are 
also Parties to the Refugee Convention and to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),45 analysing how these treaties regulate the issue of the legal 
status of asylum-seekers becomes relevant for critically assessing the Court’s case law. 
 
With regard to the Refugee Convention, Article 31(2) allows for the administrative 
detention of “refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge”. This provision affirms that 
“(…) such restrictions [including detention]46 shall only be applied until their status in 
 
40 COSTELLO, supra note 31, p. 151.  
41 MORENO-LAX, V., “Beyond Saadi v UK: Why The ‘Unnecessary’ Detention of Asylum Seekers Is 
Inadmissible Under EU law”, Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, vol. 5, n. 2, 2011, pp. 166-
206, p. 182. 
42 Article 8 of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying 
down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ L 180/96). For an analysis 
of the grounds for asylum detention under EU law, see TSOURDI, E. L., “Asylum Detention in EU Law: 
Falling between Two Stools?”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, n. 0, 2016, pp. 1-22. 
43 MORENO-LAX, supra note 41, p. 187. 
44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969 (U.N.T.S. vol. 1155, p. 331). 
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 (U.N.T.S vol. 999, p. 171 and 
vol. 1057, p. 407). 
46 NOLL, G., “Article 31 (Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refugee/Réfugiés en Situation Irrégulière 
dans le Pays d’Áccueil)”, in ZIMMERMANN, A., DÖRSCHNER, J. and MACHTS, F. (eds.), The 1951 
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the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country”. The problem 
of the Refugee Convention is that, unlike other human rights treaties, it did not create a 
treaty monitoring body with the power to issue general guidance to States to facilitate a 
consistent application of the Convention.47 Therefore, multiple interpretations arise 
regarding the question of who can be detained under this provision. Hathaway and Noll 
thoroughly analyse the travaux préparatoires of the Refugee Convention and show that 
there was no common understanding among all State Parties as to whether asylum-seekers 
whose asylum claim has been registered can be deemed to be “lawfully in” the territory 
in the sense of Article 31(2) and are thus prevented from being detained.48 
 
Legal doctrine (which, according to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, can 
act as a subsidiary means for interpreting international treaties)49 is also divided on this 
point. One group of authors understands that asylum-seekers enter a country in order to 
exercise a lawful right to seek and enjoy asylum, and should therefore be regarded as 
“lawfully in” the territory of the State as soon as they file their asylum application and 
satisfy the administrative requirements for his application to be processed. Such an 
interpretation should persist regardless of whether or not the asylum-seeker entered the 
State’s territory in an irregular manner.50 This would mean that asylum-seekers can only 
be detained before the process of determining the full merits of the claim has begun. 
Another group of scholars is of the opinion that asylum-seekers can only be regarded as 
being “lawfully in” the territory once the State has granted them a positive authorisation 
to enter the country.51 This would entail that asylum-seekers awaiting the asylum 
procedure can be detained under Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention if they entered 
the territory of the State without such a formal authorisation. 
 
For its part, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has favoured 
the view of the former group. In its submission to the Court in Saadi v. United Kingdom, 
UNHCR asserted that “status regularization, for the purposes of Article 31(2), occurs 
once the asylum-seeker submits to and meets the host State´s legal requirements to have 
his claim evaluated. (…). Thus, once the domestic law formalities for access into 
 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A commentary, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 1268. 
47 CLARK, T. and CRÉPEAU, F., “Mainstreaming Refugee Rights. The 1951 Refugee Convention and 
International Human Rights Law”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol.17, n.4, 1999, pp. 389-
410, p. 402. 
48 HATHAWAY, J. C., The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005, p. 179; NOLL, supra note 46, p. 1273. 
49 Article 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 24 October 1945, states that, in deciding 
disputes, the ICJ shall apply “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”. 
50 HATHAWAY, supra note 48; FIELD, O. and EDWARDS, A., Alternatives to Detention of Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 2006. Available at: 
https://cutt.ly/vrl1AGd; O’NIONS, supra note 34.; NOLL, supra note 46; MORENO-LAX, supra note 41; 
COSTELLO, supra note 31. 
51 GRAHL-MADSEN, A., The Status of Refugees in International Law. Vol. I. Refugee Character, A.W. 
Sijthoff, Leiden, 1966; SLINGENBERG, L., The Reception of Asylum Seekers under International Law: 
Between Sovereignty and Equality, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014. 
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determination procedures have been complied with, status is regularized (…)”.52 While 
the nature of UNHCR is that of an international diplomatic corps rather than that of an 
international legal body,53 it does play a key role in providing interpretative guidance on 
the Convention and in encouraging a harmonized application of its provisions by State 
Parties,54 promoting norms of international behaviour.55 It is therefore regrettable that the 
ECtHR has disregarded UNHCR’s position, without making a reasoned argument of why 
it chooses to interpret the term “unauthorised” in a different way. Ironically, both in Saadi 
v. UK and in Suso Musa v. Malta,56 the Court refers to the UNHCR’s 1999 Guidelines on 
Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees only to underline that they allow for the 
detention of asylum-seekers. Yet the Court does so without acknowledging that these 
Guidelines do not grant States the power to detain asylum-seekers merely to prevent their 
“unauthorised entry”. In fact, the revised 2012 UNHCR Guidelines stress that the illegal 
entry or stay of asylum-seekers by itself does not give the State an automatic power to 
detain –detention is only allowed when it is based on an exhaustive list of grounds, which 
can be whittled down to three: public order, public health and national security.57 
 
Regarding the ICCPR, Article 9(1) enshrines the right to liberty for every human being 
and lays down the circumstances under which States may detain a person. While this 
provision does not give any guidance on the problem at hand, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) has interpreted Article 9(1) in a more liberty-protective way than the 
equivalent interpretation made by the ECtHR. Although the ICCPR does not make clear 
that the Committee is to be the final interpreter of the treaty,58 the fact that the Committee 
receives periodic reports from States and other parties, along with its experience in 
applying the Covenant, has led some authors (an even some members of the HRC) to 
argue that “from a moral point of view, the interpretation provided by the HRC overrides 
interpretations provided by States”.59 Moreover, recently the Spanish Supreme Court in 
its judgment 1263/2018 has set a precedent in international human rights law by 
 
52 Quoted by NOLL, supra note 46, p. 1266. 
53 CLARK AND CRÉPEAU, supra note 47, p. 402. 
54 CHETAIL, V., “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations 
between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law”, in RUBIO-MARIN, R. (ed.), Human Rights and 
Immigration. Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 
pp. 19-72, p. 64. 
55 CHIMNI, B. S., “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South”, Journal of Refugee 
Studies, vol. 11, n. 4, 1998, pp. 350-374, p. 366. 
56 Saadi v. UK, §34; Suso Musa v. Malta, no. 42337/12, ECtHR 9 December 2013, §90. 
57 UNHCR Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, 2012, §32-33. Available at: https://cutt.ly/grRP0RH. See also the 
Conclusion relating to the detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers No. 44 (XXXVII), Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner´s Programme, 13 October 1986. Document approved by the United 
Nations General Assembly in its resolution No. 12A (A/41/12/Add.1). 
58 HARRINGTON, J., “The Human Rights Committee, Treaty Interpretation, and the Last Word”, EJIL-
Talk! [blog] 5-8-2015. Available at: https://cutt.ly/mrlBiYv. 
59 CITRONI, G., “The Human Rights Committee and its Role in Interpreting the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights vis-à-vis State Parties”, EJIL-Talk! [blog], 28-8-2015. Available at: 
https://cutt.ly/TrlVxem. 
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recognising that the decisions of supervisory bodies of human rights treaties must be 
complied with by the Spanish State.60 
 
In its General Comment on the right to liberty and in the Communication A v. Australia, 
the HRC found that detention of asylum-seekers whose claim is being resolved is 
generally arbitrary, except when there are particular reasons specific to the individual, 
such as individualized likelihood of absconding, a danger of crimes against others or a 
risk of acts against national security.61 Illegal entry alone, however, cannot be a ground 
for detention of asylum-seekers.62 Therefore, the ECtHR’s deference to the detention of 
asylum-seekers “for purely logistical reasons”63 can hardly be reconciled with the HRC 
position.  
 
The fact that the ECtHR does not consider the case law of the HRC regarding this issue 
is not only regrettable, but also reprehensible. In its famous judgment Ahmadou Sadio 
Diallo, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that “although the Court is in no 
way obliged (…) to model its own interpretation of the Covenant on that of the [Human 
Rights] Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation 
adopted by this independent body (…)”.64 While the ECtHR has to interpret the European 
Convention of Human Rights in the light of the ICCPR (Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties), in this legal exercise the Court is allowed to form its 
own interpretation of this treaty, which may differ from that of the HRC. However, if the 
ICJ –which is not a human rights court– ascribes “great weight” to the Committee´s 
general comments, there is a strong case to be made that a human rights court like the 
ECtHR should give even greater weight to these comments. This is even more the case if 
we take into account that, as a Court with the constitutional aspiration of developing 
general human rights standards within the area of the Council of Europe, the ECtHR needs 
to deploy external references to enhance the persuasiveness of its interpretation.65 The 
Court itself has stated this in the leading judgment Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, where 
it unmistakeably clarified that it views the provisions of the Convention in the broader 
context of international law.66  
 
60 Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo (Sala 3ª, Sección 4ª) de 22 de marzo de 2018 (ES:TS:2018:1263). See 
GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA, C., “La Aplicación en España de los Dictámenes de Comités Internacionales: La 
STS 1263/2018, un Importante Punto de Inflexión”, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, vol. 10, n. 2, 
2018, pp. 836-851. 
61 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, 16 December 2014 (CCPR/C/GC/35); A. v. 
Australia, Communication No. 560/1993, HRC 30 April 1997. 
62  A. v. Australia, §9(2). 
63 BATTJES, supra note 38, p. 270. 
64 Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), 
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 639, §66. For an analysis of the judgment, see GHANDHI, S., 
“Human Rights and the International Court of Justice. The Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case”, Human Rights 
Law Review, vol. 11, n. 3, 2011, pp. 527-555.  
65 FAHRAT, A., “Enhancing Constitutional Justice by Using External References: The European Court of 
Human Rights’ Reasoning on the Protection against Expulsion”, Leiden Journal of International Law, n. 
28, pp. 303-322, p. 320. 
66 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, no. 34503/97, ECtHR 12 November 2008, §37-52, 147-154. See 
FAHRAT, supra note 65, p. 319; and SMYTH, C., “The Best Interests of the Child in the Expulsion and 
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2. Nabil v. Hungary: Asylum-seekers may be Detained “With a View to Deportation” 
 
The second exception to the principle of non-detention of migrants is the case that action 
is being taken against that person “with a view to deportation or extradition”, as stated by 
the second limb of Article 5(1)(f). As in the first limb of this Article, the question that 
arises is whether or not this is a valid ground for detaining migrants who have applied for 
asylum. There is no doubt that asylum-seekers whose claim has been rejected by the 
highest instance can be detained “with a view to deportation”, but what about those who 
are still awaiting a first decision on their asylum application or the outcome of the review 
of a negative decision? 
 
In its leading case on the second limb of Article 5(1)(f), Chahal v. UK, the Court 
considered that the period in which the asylum-seeker had been detained on pre-
deportation grounds while his asylum claim was still pending “was not excessive”.67 
Therefore, as early as 1996, it implicitly authorised detention of asylum-seekers in the 
context of an expulsion procedure. 
 
More than a decade later, the Court nuanced its position in S.D. v. Greece and in R.U. v. 
Greece.68 In these judgements, the Court used the following logic to find that an asylum-
seeker could not be detained “in view of his expulsion”: (1) national law –as well as the 
Refugee Convention- does not allow for the expulsion of an asylum-seeker until his claim 
has been finally rejected; (2) national law only permits detention for expulsion purposes 
when that expulsion can be executed; (3) therefore, detention of an asylum-seeker for 
expulsion purposes is in violation of national law because his expulsion cannot be 
executed while his asylum claim is still pending. 
 
Costello asserts that these judgements are in tension with Chahal.69 Such tension is 
visible, however, they cannot be considered to be in direct contradiction to the Court´s 
position in Chahal, because both judgements very much focus on whether or not detention 
is in accordance with national law. Nonetheless, the judgements don’t actually conclude 
that Article 5(1)(f) itself prohibits detention of asylum-seekers “in view of their 
expulsion”. 
 
During the climax of the refugee crisis, namely September 2015, the ECtHR offered 
clarification on this issue. In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, the Court explicitly stated that 
detention with a view to deportation of an asylum-seeker with a pending asylum claim is 
admissible under Article 5(1)(f) because “an eventual dismissal of the asylum application 
could open the way to the execution of the deportation orders”.70 The current section will 
 
First-entry Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: How Principled is the Court’s Use of 
the Principle?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 70, n. 103, pp. 70-103, p. 73. 
67 Chahal v. UK, no. 22414/93, ECtHR 15 November 1996, §116. 
68 S.D. v. Greece, no. 53541/07, ECtHR 11 September 2009, §62 and R.U. v. Greece, no. 2237/08, ECtHR 
7 September 2011, §94-96. 
69 COSTELLO, C., The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 292. 
70 Nabil and Others v. Hungary, §38. 
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argue that this interpretation is at odds with the guarantees that the Court provides to 
detained asylum-seekers when read in the light of the Refugee Convention. 
 
On the one hand, the same argument can be made as in regard to the detention of asylum-
seekers under the first limb of Article 5(1)(f). If we follow the view that asylum-seekers 
whose claim has been registered are lawfully in the country, then Article 31(2) of the 
Refugee Convention cannot be applied to them and thus their detention is in violation of 
that Convention. But even accepting that the Court is legitimately supporting the view 
according to which registered asylum-seekers may be refugees unlawfully in the country, 
there are compelling reasons to conclude that pre-deportation detention of asylum-seekers 
whose claim is being processed is not permissible under international law without further 
requisites. 
 
Firstly, the prohibition of refoulement enshrined in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention 
and in Article 3 ECHR71 entails that, in order to determine whether or not the expulsion 
of the asylum-seeker would put him at risk of persecution, the State has to scrutinise the 
individual circumstances of the applicant. Therefore, the State cannot promote expulsion 
until the authorities have made a final decision on the merits that the asylum-seeker is not 
a refugee in the sense of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention.72 This was in fact 
acknowledged by the Court in R.U. v. Greece, when it stated that “it follows from Articles 
31 to 33 of the Refugee Convention that the expulsion of a person who has filed an asylum 
claim is not permissible until there has been a final decision rejecting the asylum claim”.73 
More specifically for second-instance decisions, in Gebremedhin the Court affirmed that 
Article 13 ECHR −in connection with Article 3− requires that remedies against decisions 
to expel individuals to a country where there may be a risk of refoulement must have 
automatic suspensive effect.74 Even in the case of shared protective responsibility 
arrangements such as the safe third country concept or the Dublin Regulation,75 asylum-
seekers cannot be expelled until the authorities have declared the application inadmissible 
after ascertaining that the individual applicant does not face a risk of indirect refoulement 
 
71 The inclusion of the prohibition of refoulement in Article 3 ECHR was developed through the case law 
of the Court. The leading cases in this respect are Soering v. UK, no. 14038/88, ECtHR 07 July 1989 and 
Vilvarajah and Others v. UK, no. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87, 13448/87, ECtHR 30 October 
1991. For a recent publication on non-refoulement, see SOLER GARCÍA, C., Los Límites a la Expulsión 
de Extranjeros ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión 
Europea, Aranzadi, Madrid, 2019. 
72 Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, Non-Refoulement No. 6 (XXVIII), 1977 (UNGA No. 
12A, A/32/12/Add.1). 
73 R.U. v. Greece, no. 2237/08, ECtHR 7 September 2011, §94. 
74 Gebremedhin v. France, no. 25389/05, ECtHR 26 April 2007, §66. 
75 For the safe third country concept, see Articles 38 and 39 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (OJ L 180/60); for Dublin procedures, see Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged 
in one of the member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) (OJ L 180/31). 
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(see Hirsi v. Italy)76 or of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment (see Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland)77. 
 
Secondly, in order for detention to be justified under the second limb of Article 5(1)(f), 
the ECtHR requires that there be a realistic prospect of removal.78 However, if the 
principle of non-refoulement forbids deportation until the asylum claim has been rejected, 
it seems unreasonable to affirm that there is a realistic prospect of removal in the case of 
an asylum-seeker whose claim has not yet been assessed with a final negative decision. 
In Nabil, the Court appears to liken an “eventual dismissal of the asylum application” to 
a “realistic prospect of removal”. But is that reading correct? In our view, the only way 
to affront this issue in line with the principle of proportionality and of legal certainty is to 
affirm that there is only a realistic prospect of removal when the claim of the asylum-
seeker has been finally rejected. An “eventual dismissal” of the asylum claim seems too 
remote an event for the purposes of calling the prospect of removal “realistic”. 
 
Moreover, the Court has asserted that, in order for detention to be compatible with the 
second limb of Article 5(1)(f), the expulsion procedure must be in progress and the State 
and the authorities must conduct this procedure with due diligence,79 taking active steps 
to remove the person from the territory as quickly as possible.80 However, as noted by 
Matevzic, actions for the preparation of the expulsion of asylum-seekers, such as 
contacting the authorities of their country of origin in order to obtain their documents, 
cannot be carried out while their claim is still under review; because that would put the 
asylum-seeker at risk of being identified by the prosecuting actor and would thus 
contravene the very purpose of Geneva Convention.81 Therefore, the expulsion procedure 
of an asylum-seeker cannot be in progress. 
 
For all these reasons, we disagree with the Court´s view regarding this issue, and consider 
that the second limb of Article 5(1)(f) cannot be applied to asylum-seekers whose claim 
is still under consideration, at least not without further requirements. So as not to 
completely block States’ removal policies, the Court could allow for certain exceptions 
to this rule in cases where the asylum-seeker was already detained for the purpose of 
removal before lodging the application. Both UNHCR82 and EU law allow83 for such 
 
76 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, no. 27765/09, ECtHR 23 February 2011. 
77 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, no. 29217/12, ECtHR 04 November 2014. 
78 S.Z. v. Greece, no. 66702/13, ECtHR 21 June 2018, §54. 
79 S.Z. v. Greece, §53; Thimothawes v. Belgium, §60; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, §137; R.T. v. Greece, §86; 
A.Y. v. Greece, §85; Nabil and Others v. Hungary, §29; A.E. v. Greece, no. 46673/10, ECtHR 27 February 
2015, §49; S.C. v. Romania, no. 9356/11, ECtHR 10 February 2015, §57. 
80 J.N. v. UK, no. 37289/12, ECtHR 19 May 2016, §107. 
81 MATEVZIC, G., “Detention of asylum-seekers under the scope of Article 5.1(f) of ECHR – some 
thoughts based on recent ECHR and CJEU jurisprudence”, European Database of Asylum Law [journal], 
14-09-2016. Available at https://cutt.ly/2rlBRbF. 
82 According to UNHCR, asylum-seekers may be detained on grounds of expulsion where there are grounds 
for believing that the asylum-seeker has introduced an asylum claim merely to frustrate an expulsion 
decision, in order to prevent absconding while the claim is being assessed. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra 
note 57, §32-33. 
83 Article 8(3)(d) of the recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCD) allows for the detention of an asylum-
seeker who was already detained before making an application when the Member State “can substantiate, 
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exceptions, which are closely linked to a reprehensible conduct on the part of the asylum-
seeker −a conduct which, in any case, should be duly proved by the authorities on the 
basis of objective criteria.84 However, the broad discretion that Nabil grants States to 
detain asylum-seekers in order to effect an expulsion which may never materialise 
provides for a much lower protection of the right to liberty than these other legal orders. 
On a positive note, the Court provides detained asylum-seekers awaiting expulsion with 
a time-related guarantee: when the detained migrant awaiting expulsion applies for 
asylum, the State has to speedily process and decide the asylum claim.85  
 
3. A recent example: the grounds for detention and the EU-Turkey Statement 
 
In the cases Kaak and Others v. Greece, O.S.A. and Others v. Greece and J.R. and Others 
v. Greece we find an example of the large margin of appreciation that the Court gives to 
States regarding the grounds for asylum detention in the context of a deal which has been 
at the core of the European response to the refugee crisis: the EU-Turkey Statement.86 In 
these judgments, the Court affirmed that the detention of asylum-seekers in the Greek 
hotspots87 complied with the grounds under Article 5(1)(f) because it was intended “to 
prevent irregular stay in the Greek territory, to guarantee their eventual expulsion and to 
identify and register [the asylum-seekers] in the framework of the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement”.88 Although this paragraph may appear to add a third ground for 
detention under Article 5(1)(f), identification of asylum-seekers is in fact a means to 
“prevent their effecting an unauthorised entry”. This is corroborated by the findings of 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in K. v. Staatssecretaris, where that Court 
concluded that an initial detention for the purpose of identification during preliminary 
asylum proceedings (Article 8(3)(a) of the recast Reception Conditions Directive or 
RCD) can be subsumed under the first limb of Article 5(1)(f).89 The use of this repetitive 
 
on the basis of objective criteria, including that he or she already had the opportunity to access the asylum 
procedure,  that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is making the asylum merely in order 
to delay or frustrate the enforcement of the return decision” [emphasis added]. See in this regard the 
judgments of the CJEU Arslan, EU:C:2013:343 and Gnandi, ECLI:EU:C:2018:465, which shed light on 
the interplay between the RCD and the Return Directive. On the other hand, Article 8(3)(e) allows for 
detention in order to protect national security or public order in conjunction with an expulsion decision, as 
interpreted by the CJEU in J.N., EU:C:2016:84. For an analysis of the latter judgment, see PEERS, S. 
“Detention of asylum-seekers: the first CJEU judgment”, EU law Analysus [Blog], 9-3-2016. Available at 
https://cutt.ly/ItBlts0. 
84 TSOURDI, supra note 42, p. 15. 
85 S.M.M. v. UK, no. 77450/12, EctHR 22 June 2017, §84-85. 
86 EU-Turkey statement. European Council Press release, 18 March 2016. Available at: 
https://cutt.ly/XrEjD5K. 
87  For a thorough overview of the legal issues surrounding hotspots see ZIEBRITZKI, C. and NESTLER, 
R., “Hotspots an der EU-Aussengrenze. Eine rechtliche Bestandsaufnahme”, MPIL Research Paper Series, 
n. 17, 2017. For the specific issue of detention in these premises, see MAJCHER, I., supra note 13. 
88 Kaak and Others v. Greece, no. 34215/16, ECtHR 3 October 2019, §103; O.S.A. and Others v. Greece, 
no. 39065/16, ECtHR 21 March 2019, §64; J.R. and Others v. Greece, §112. 
89 Judgment of 14 September 2017, K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, C-18/16, 
EU:C:2018:296, §50-55. See Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ L 180/96). 
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phrase by the ECtHR is therefore bizarre, and the reasoning behind it may well be that 
the Court is implicitly endorsing the EU-Turkey Statement, as argued by Pinjenburg.90 
As a final clarification, it should be noted that the EU-Turkey Statement was not the legal 
ground on which the Greek authorities relied in these cases for detaining the asylum-
seekers –it was national domestic law. The EU-Turkey Statement does not enshrine any 
provision regarding the detention of migrants and asylum-seekers, but, even if it did, 
relying on it for the purpose of detaining asylum-seekers would have been an outright 
violation of Article 5. As we will see in the following section, the detention of a migrant 
under Article 5(1)(f) must be in accordance with national law. The EU-Turkey Statement 
can hardly be considered to form part of the Greek legal order, since the Greek 
Government, like all other EU Member States, do not view the Statement as legally 
binding. Although there is a heated doctrinal debate on whether or not the EU-Turkey 
Statement is a treaty,91 the uncertainty surrounding its legal nature would likely make 
detention under its provisions incompatible with the principles of clarity, foreseeability 
and legal security. 
 
 
III. THE LAWFULNESS OF THE DETENTION AND THE PROHIBITION OF 
ARBITRARINESS 
 
A State might detain an asylum-seeker for one of the two admissible purposes to which 
Article 5(1)(f) refers whilst still acting in violation of the Convention. This is the case 
because the arrest or detention must be “lawful”, as both the first paragraph of Article 5 
and Article 5(1)(f) set out.92 The ECtHR has paid special attention to this term, since the 
lawfulness of the detention is directly connected to the core principle of Article 5: the 
prohibition of arbitrariness.93 Indeed, the Court has developed an extensive jurisprudence 
that sets forth the requirements that the detention must comply with. These requirements 
apply to detention based on the first limb of Article 5(1)(f) in the same way that they 
apply to detention grounded on the second limb,94 and, as a result, the distinction between 
them is often blurred.95 Since the authorities restrict a fundamental right through 
 
90 PIJNENBURG, A., “JR and Others v. Greece: what does the Court (not) say about the EU-Turkey 
Statement?”, Strasbourg Observers [blog], 21-2-2018. Available at: https://cutt.ly/IrlBG9H. 
91 See, for example, GATTI, M. and OTT, A., “The EU-Turkey Statement: Legal Nature and Compatibility 
with EU Institutional Law”, in CARRERA, S., SANTOS VARA, J. and STRIK, T. (eds.), 
Constitutionalising the External Dimension of EU Migration Policies in Times of Crisis, Elgaronline, 2019. 
92 The first paragraph establishes the obligation of the authorities to follow “a procedure prescribed by law”. 
In Kahadawa Arachchige and Others v. Cyprus, nos. 16870/11, 16874/11, 16879/11, ECtHR 19 June 2018, 
§59, the Court affirmed that the requirements of a “lawful” detention in the sense of Article 5(1)(f) also 
apply to the obligation of the first paragraph of Article 5. 
93 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §56. 
94 Ibid, §65; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, no. 47287/15, ECtHR 14 March 2017, §62. 
95 CORNELISSE, G., Immigration Detention and Human Rights, Brill / Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010, p. 283. For 
example, in K.G. v. Belgium, no. 52548/15, ECtHR 6 November 2018, a case where the asylum-seeker had 
been irregularly staying in Belgium for many years, the Court found that the he had been detained both in 
order to prevent his unauthorised entry and to prepare his expulsion.  
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detention, it is for them to demonstrate that they have complied with these requirements 
and thus have the lawful authority to detain the asylum-seeker.96  
 
As extensive as the case law of the Court on this point might be, the protection offered to 
the asylum-seeker by these conditions is limited when balanced against the wide margin 
of appreciation that the Court grants States by not requiring them to show that detention 
is necessary to achieve any particular aim in the individual case. The current section will 
first systematize the limitations to the detention of asylum-seekers put forward by the 
Court and proceed by addressing the controversial issue of the lack of the necessity and 
proportionality test. 
 
1. Compliance with National Law 
 
First, the deprivation of liberty must “essentially” conform to the substantive and 
procedural rules of national law.97 This means that the ECtHR may satisfy itself that the 
State’s actions are in compliance with national law98. It may, therefore, not need to 
consider other legal sources so as to determine the lawfulness of a detention. As such, we 
find an interplay between national law and the ECHR, since the Court has to examine the 
requirements set out in national law in order to determine whether the detention is in 
conformity with the Convention. However, the scope of the Court´s task in this 
connection is subject to limits “inherent in the logic of the European system of 
protection”.99 In effect, the scope of the ECtHR´s review over national law is restricted, 
for it is in the first place for the national authorities, most notably the courts, to interpret 
and apply the domestic law.100 
 
The ECtHR thus limits its examination as to whether the national authorities’ 
interpretation of national legislation when issuing or reviewing a detention order is 
“arbitrary or patently unreasonable”101 and to whether the effects of that interpretation are 
in conformity with the ECHR.102 As an example, in Nabil and Others v. Hungary, the 
Court noted that, under Hungarian law, in order to detain a migrant for the purpose of 
expulsion, the authorities have to prove that the detention is necessary to prevent the 
individual from frustrating the enforcement of the expulsion.103 This was not done by the 
authorities in the case at hand. Although this “proof of necessity” is not required under 
the ECHR –as will be explained below– the fact that national law prescribed this entailed 
that the detention became unlawful under Article 5(1)(f). Conversely, in Mahammad and 
Others v. Greece the Court declared that under Greek law, detention of asylum-seekers is 
 
96 S.M.M. v. UK, §85. 
97 S.Z. v. Greece, §53; Kahadawa v. Cyprus, §59; S.M.M. v. UK, §63; Richmond Yaw and Others v. Italy, 
nos. 3342/11, 3391/11, 3408/11, 3447/11, ECtHR 6 October 2016, §69; O.M. v. Hungary, §41; J.N. v. UK, 
§75; Mahamed Jama v. Malta, §139; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, no. 16483/12, ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 
15 December 2016, §91. 
98 Nabil and Others v. Hungary, §31. 
99 Ibid, §31. 
100 S.M.M. v. UK, §64. 
101 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §71. 
102 Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, §63. 
103 Nabil and Others v. Hungary, §39-43. 
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permitted when it is necessary in order to verify their identity, which was the case at hand, 
and therefore the detention had been lawful under Article 5(1)(f).104 
 
When the decision to detain shows a “serious and manifest irregularity” with respect to 
the requirements set out in national law, the Court has exceptionally declared that the 
decision is ex face unlawful. In order to determine this irregularity, the ECtHR considers 
whether national jurisprudence is clear about the requirement at hand and whether, in 
spite of such purported clarity, national authorities have failed to comply with it.105 
 
2. Compliance with international law… and EU law? 
 
Where does this leave compliance of the detention with international standards? As 
already emphasized, the Court uses the term “essentially” [conform to national law],106 
which implies that, whilst national law is the first source that the Court refers to, it is not 
the only one. The Court has further elaborated this idea in various judgments, asserting 
that “Article 5(1) refers not only to standards of domestic law but also, where appropriate, 
to other standards applicable to the persons concerned, including those found in 
international law”.107 Compliance with international law is thus the second condition for 
a detention to be “lawful”. 
 
On the other hand, compliance with EU law is not directly a requisite for detention to be 
“lawful” under Article 5(1)(f). It is however an indirect requisite, provided that the 
Directives are clearly transposed in national law –in which case, the Court will again 
apply the principle of limiting itself to examine whether the interpretation of national law 
is arbitrary or patently unreasonable. This interaction between EU law and the ECHR 
results in increased protection for asylum, contributing to the constitutionalization of 
asylum and immigration detention in the EU.108  
 
Firstly, EU Member States that are part of the Common European Asylum System are 
required to establish in their national law that asylum-seekers have a right to remain in 
the territory until a first-instance decision has been made (Article 9 of the recast Asylum 
Procedures Directive or APD).109 Although Member States may refrain from authorising 
entry or stay of asylum-seekers −and thus detain them− in exceptional situations,110 it is 
 
104 Mahammad and Others v. Greece, no. 48352/12, ECtHR 15 April 2015, §6. 
105 Richmond Yaw and Others v. Italy, §73. 
106 Nabil and Others v. Hungary, §30. 
107 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §71, Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, §63. 
108 CORNELISSE, G., “Detention and transnational law in the European Union: constitutional protection 
between complementarity and inconsistency”, in FLYNN, M. J. and FLYNN, M. B. (eds.), Challenging 
Immigration Detention: Academics, Activists and Policy-Makers, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Cheltenham, 2017, pp. 222-238, p. 232. 
109 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ L 180/60). 
110 They may do so in the limited number of cases where the use of a border procedure is allowed (Article 
8(3)(c) RPD read together with Articles 43, 31(8) and 33 APD) or for an initial screening in cases where 
the asylum applicant fails to cooperate with the authorities during the preliminary steps of the asylum claim, 
especially if there is a risk of absconding (Article 8(3)(a) and (b) RCD as interpreted by the CJEU in K., 
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undisputable that once the State has allowed the asylum-seeker to remain in accordance 
with Article 9 APD, detention is no longer permissible “to prevent an unauthorised entry”. 
This was acknowledged by the ECtHR in O.M. v. Hungary,111 where it observed that 
“where a State (…) enacts legislation (of its own motion or pursuant to European Union 
law) explicitly authorising the entry or stay of immigrants pending an asylum application, 
an ensuing detention for the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry may raise an 
issue as to the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5(1)(f)”. 
 
While the expression “may raise an issue” is far from new in the case law of the Court,112 
its use in this context is questionable. It is here argued that the expression “may/could 
raise an issue” should only be used when it is not certain that a particular situation would 
be in breach of a fundamental right. However, it is evident that a detention where the 
entry or stay is authorised would infringe national law and thus violate Article 5(1)(f). 
This ambiguous statement is therefore unfortunate, as States might regard it as a semi-
open door for them to lawfully detain asylum-seekers under the ECHR in order to prevent 
their “unauthorised entry” even when they act in violation of their own national law. This 
is even more the case if we read O.M. v. Hungary in the light of the pre-2015 judgment 
Suso Musa v. Malta, where the Court stated to a somewhat vaguer degree that “it would 
be hard” to consider the measure as being compatible with Article 5(1)(f).113 
 
Secondly, the EU asylum acquis requires Member States to lay down in national law that 
the detention of an asylum-seeker can only be effected when it is strictly necessary, that 
is, when no alternatives to detention are viable.114 If a State does not do this, it is not only 
violating national and EU law, but also Article 5 ECHR, because of the requirement of 
this article that national law has to be complied with.  
 
Another example of interaction between the two orders can be found in the Chamber 
judgment Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, where, after reiterating the elements of an arbitrary 
detention, the Court further “noted” that, in accordance with the Asylum Procedures 
Directive, EU Member States should not hold a person in detention for the sole reason 
that he or she is an asylum applicant.115 It thus seems that the ECtHR was taking into 
account EU law not only to determine if the detention was lawful under national law, but 
also in order to establish whether or not the detention was arbitrary. This could be seen 
as a positive advancement of the jurisprudence of the Court since, in a previous judgment 
 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:680). For an explanation of border procedures, see CORNELISSE, G., “Territory, 
Procedures and Rights: Border Procedures in European Asylum Law”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 35, 
n. 1, 2017, pp. 74-90. In our view, the most problematic ground for detention under EU law is the case 
when border procedures are used merely because the applicant comes from a “safe country of origin” 
(Article 31(8)(b) APD), since the ground for detention is not based on a misbehaviour of the asylum-seeker.   
111 O.M. v. Hungary, §47. 
112 As an example, the European Commission on Human Rights already used this expression in the Decision 
X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 9088/80, 6 March 1982, §1. 
113 Suso Musa v. Malta, no. 42337/12, ECtHR 9 December 2013, §97. 
114 This is established in both primary law (Article 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and in 
secondary law (Article 8(2) RCD, Article 28(2) Dublin Regulation). See MORENO-LAX, supra note 41. 
115 Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, §64. 
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against Hungary, namely Lokpo and Touré v. Hungary,116 the ECtHR failed to take into 
account the violation of this same provision of the APD in its assessment of the lawfulness 
of detention.117 However, as will be seen in section VI, the Grand Chamber overturned 
the positive steps taken in Ilias and Ahmed. 
 
In any case, the Court clearly separates its role from the EU acquis. For example, in J.N. 
v. UK., it asserted that “the Return Directive118 is not to be taken as the only system 
conceivable in Europe as being compatible with sub-paragraph (f)”.119 Especially when a 
Directive has not adequately been transposed into the national legal system, the Court has 
declared that assessing whether national law complies with the Directives is beyond the 
limits of its competence. In the words of the Court, “it is primarily for national authorities 
to interpret and apply domestic legislation, if necessary in conformity with the law of the 
European Union.120 This follows the principle of primacy of EU law –established by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in, inter alia, Costa v. ENEL and Simmenthal121– 
according to which national courts have to interpret domestic legislation in conformity 
with EU law and exclude the application of national legislation that contradicts it. 
 
3. Compliance of national law with the ECHR 
 
The third requirement for a detention to be lawful is that domestic law itself complies with 
the ECHR, including the general principles contained therein –particularly those that refer 
to the rule of law and to legal certainty.122 The latter implies that where a national law 
authorises the deprivation of liberty it must be sufficiently accessible and precise so that 
the detainee can foresee to a reasonable degree the consequences that will derive from a 
particular act.123 The importance of adopting laws which clearly govern the substantive 
requirements and procedural guarantees of the detention of migrants was particularly 
stressed by the Grand Chamber in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy124. This is an aspect of the 
judgement that has been positively acclaimed by scholars.125 
 
In order to assess whether domestic law is sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable, 
the Court carries out an evaluation of the “quality of the law”. In doing this, the Court 
might take into account factors such as the existence of clear legal provisions for ordering 
 
116 Lokpo and Touré v. Hungary, no. 10816/10, ECtHR 20 September 2011. 
117 This observation was made by Costello. See COSTELLO, supra note 69, p. 287. 
118 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ L 
348/98). 
119 J.N. v. UK, §91. 
120 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §71; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, §63. 
121 Judgment of 9 March 1978, Simmenthal, C-106/77, EU:C:1978:49; Judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa v. 
E.N.E.L., C-6/64, EU:C:1964:66. 
122 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §62; Richmond Yaw and Others v. Italy, §69; J.N. v. UK, §76; Khlaifia and 
Others v. Italy (Grand Chamber), §91. 
123 Richmond Yaw and Others v. Italy, §70; J.N. v. UK, §77. 
124 Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (Grand Chamber), §97-108. 
125 ZIRULIA, S. and PEERS, S., “A template for protecting human rights during the ‘refugee crisis’? 
Immigration detention and the expulsion of migrants in a recent ECtHR Grand Chamber ruling”, EU law 
Analysis [blog], 5-1-2017. Available at https://cutt.ly/3rlB1A4. 
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detention, for extending detention and for setting time limits for detention.126 However, a 
general control of the ECtHR over national legislation cannot be invoked by an individual 
who has not been affected by the incompatibility of national law with the Convention in 
a particular case; since “the Court has not a task of controlling legislation or practice in 
the abstract but it must be limited, without forgetting the general context, to address 
whether the manner in which that law affected the applicant was in breach of the 
Convention”.127  
 
The reluctance of the Court to control the compatibility between national law and the 
ECHR in the abstract might be seen as another instance of deference to State’s 
sovereignty. This deference can be observed in the Chamber judgment Ilias and Ahmed 
v. Hungary, a case in which the Court casted doubts on the “clarity and foreseeability” of 
the domestic provisions on which the authorities had grounded the detention,128 but did 
not make any statement on whether these provisions were compatible with the ECHR. 
Similarly, in Suso Musa v. Malta, in Abdi Mahamud v. Malta and in Mahamed Jama v. 
Malta, the Court “expressed reservations” about the quality of all the applicable laws, but 
nevertheless accepted that these laws provide a sufficiently clear legal basis for the 
detention of asylum-seekers.129 
 
This third requirement also implies that national authorities have to interpret national law 
not only in conformity with the ECHR but also in conformity with the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR. This is not expressly stated by the Court, however, it is a direct consequence 
of this third requirement: if there has to be a consistency at the normative level (between 
national law and the ECHR), then this consistency must also be applied at the 
implementation level (between the national jurisprudence and the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR). This is again exemplified in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, where the Court stated 
that the national authorities had “elastically interpreted” a general provision of national 
law in order to detain an asylum-seeker without any formal decision, a procedure which 
“falls short of the requirements enounced in the Court´s case law”.130 
 
4. The prohibition of arbitrariness 
 
Finally, the fourth requirement set out by the Court is that any deprivation of liberty must 
be in accordance with the “fundamental principle”131 of protecting the individual from 
arbitrariness. Furthermore, this prohibition demands that both the order to detain and the 
execution of the detention genuinely conform with the purpose of the restrictions 
permitted by Article 5(1)(f).132 Nonetheless, Article 5(1)(f) does not require there to be 
automatic judicial review of immigration detention, although the Court may take the 
 
126 J.N. v. UK, §77, §90. 
127 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §71; J.N. v. UK, §100; N.M. v. Romania, no. 75325/11, ECtHR 10 May 2015, 
§81. 
128 Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, §66. 
129 Abdu Mahamud v. Malta, §129; Mahamed Jama v. Malta, §144; Suso Musa v. Malta, §99. 
130 Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, §68. 
131 Kahadawa v. Cyprus, §59; J.N. v. UK, §78; Mahamed Jama v. Malta, §139. 
132 S.M.M. v. UK, §66; J.N. v. UK, §80. 
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effectiveness of any existing remedy into consideration in its overall assessment of the 
“arbitrariness test”.133 
 
The notion of “arbitrariness” in Article 5(1) extends beyond lack of conformity with 
national law. This means that the deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of 
domestic law but still arbitrary and therefore contrary to the Convention.  
 
But what exactly is arbitrariness? The Court has settled a clear jurisprudence in this 
respect. To avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article 5(1) (f): (1) must be 
carried out in good faith; (2) must be closely connected to the grounds of detention relied 
on by the Government; (3) there must be some relationship between the ground of 
permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place and conditions of detention, and 
(4) the length of the detention must not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose 
pursued.134 Interestingly, this “arbitrariness test” is almost identical to the one applied by 
the British domestic courts, namely the so-called Hardial Singh principles.135 
 
The requirement of good faith played an important role in Abdullahi Elmi v. Malta and in 
Aarabi v. Greece. In both cases –which concerned the detention of minors– assessing 
whether or not the authorities had acted in good faith entailed an evaluation of the 
behaviour of the asylum-seeker (e.g. the information he had provided the authorities 
regarding his age) and of the authorities (e.g. how long it had taken for them to determine 
the applicant’s age). This is, in our view, the correct manner to analyse the good faith 
requirement. However, in another case, E.A. v. Greece, the Court found that “the good 
faith of the authorities cannot be put into question”136 merely because the State had 
justified the detention of the asylum-seeker on the grounds provided for in Article 5(1)(f). 
Thus, the Court set an iuris tantum presumption of good faith when the authorities rely 
on such a ground. This results in an inconsistency of the Court’s case law, as it confuses 
the requirement that there are grounds for detention with the requirement of good faith, 
the latter of which forms part of the arbitrariness test and demands a scrutiny of the 
authorities’ factual behaviour. The Court’s assertion in E.A. v. Greece is yet another 
example of the Court’s readiness to accept the actions of the State in recent asylum 
detention cases –as in other migration-related judgments, it is the State which is most 
often given the benefit of the doubt.137 
 
As for condition number (2) (connection between the detention and the grounds), the State 
will only comply with it if the grounds relied on to detain the asylum-seeker are provided 
for in national law, for otherwise there would be a de facto detention, that is, a detention 
“not incarnated by a formal decision of legal relevance”,138 which automatically violates 
 
133 J.N. v. UK, §94. 
134 S.Z. v. Greece, §53; Kahadawa v Cyprus, §60; Thimothawes v. Belgium, §64; J.R. and Others v. Greece, 
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the prohibition of arbitrariness. With regard to requirement number (3) (place and 
conditions of detention), it is here where the jurisprudence of the Court regarding Article 
5(1)(f) and Article 3 find its connection: on occasion, the requirement of legality 
encompasses concerns relating to the detention conditions, especially when the detention 
of vulnerable individuals is at issue.139 For this reason, in cases where the Court had 
already found a violation of Article 3 due to the existence of degrading conditions of 
detention, it did not consider it necessary to pronounce itself on this matter in the 
assessment of the arbitrariness under Article 5.140  
 
The prohibition of arbitrariness is directly linked with the principle of proportionality, 
which is applied by the Court in a very limited way, namely “only to the extent that the 
detention should not continue for an unreasonable length of time”.141 Therefore, the 
“proportionality test” is included in the arbitrariness test, but only regarding the length of 
the detention –requirement number (4). This interpretation follows the Chahal 
judgement.142 We may question, however, whether the Court´s interpretation 
encapsulates the true meaning of “proportionality”. 
 
5. The lack of a full proportionality test 
 
In his detailed book on the subject, Barak analyses the elements of the principle of 
proportionality, drawing from the common constitutional traditions of States around the 
world, and shows that it is made up of four components: 
 
(1) Proper purpose: the authorization to limit a constitutional right does not only have to 
be legal, but also legitimate. In a constitutional democracy, a proper purpose is one 
that suits the values of a democratic society. 
(2) Rational connection: the use of the means to limit the right would rationally lead to 
the realization of the law´s purpose. That is to say, the limiting law increases the 
likelihood of realizing the legitimate purpose. 
(3) Necessary means: the legislator has to choose –of all those means that may advance 
the purpose of the limiting law– that which would least limit the human right in 
question. The means which restrict the right can only be used if the purpose cannot 
be achieved through the use of other means that would equally satisfy the purpose. 
(4) Balancing or proportionality stricto sensu: A proper relation (“proportional” in the 
narrow sense) should exist between the benefits gained by the public when the 
purpose is fulfilled and the harm caused to the constitutional right of the individual.143  
If we translate these four requirements to the Court´s jurisprudence, we find that: 
(1) Migration control, which is a value generally accepted in democratic societies, is the 
legitimate purpose for restricting the human right to liberty of migrants. This purpose 
is reflected in Article 5(1)(f). It is however debatable that migration control per se 
 
139 COSTELLO, supra note 69, p. 286. 
140 A.Y. v. Greece, §88. 
141 J.N. v. UK, §82. 
142 Chahal v. UK, no. 22414/93, ECtHR 15 November 1996. 
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(i.e. preventing irregular entry and ensuring expulsion), without additional reasons, 
can be a legitimate purpose for detaining asylum-seekers, as we have discussed in 
section II. 
(2) In its “arbitrariness test”, the ECtHR takes into account whether the detention of the 
asylum-seeker is closely connected to the grounds of detention relied on by the 
Government. The Court therefore fulfils this element of the principle of 
proportionality. 
(3) As repeatedly stated by the Court both in the cases analysed that relate to the first limb 
of Article 5(1)(f) –following Saadi– and to the second limb –following Chahal–, the 
State does not have to justify the necessity of the detention.144 For example, they do 
not have to justify that the detention is necessary to prevent the individual from 
committing an offence or fleeing. Therefore, it does not require the State to look for 
alternatives to detention before issuing a detention order. 
(4) As noted by Moreno-Lax, the search for a “fair balance” between the requirements of 
the public interest and the protection of individual rights inheres in the entire 
ECHR.145 Undoubtedly, the balancing act entails taking into account the individual 
circumstances of the person who is to be detained. However, when it comes to 
detention of asylum-seekers, the Court only requires States to take into account the 
individual circumstances of the person when vulnerability is detected, as will be 
explained in section V. Therefore, the Court very much limits the scope of the 
balancing test. This is proven by the fact that, in the case law that we have reviewed, 
the only mention to the balancing act is made in a case regarding detention of children, 
namely Bistieva and Others v. Poland.146 
 
From this analysis we come to the following conclusions: on the one hand, the 
understanding of the Court of what “proportionality” means in the context of asylum 
detention is unusual, for it refers to the duration of detention, which is only an element to 
be taken into account when carrying out the balancing act. On the other hand, the ECtHR 
falls short of compelling States to effect a true “proportionality test” when detaining 
migrants and asylum-seekers, since, in its case law, the element of necessity is not present 
and the element of proportionality stricto sensu is incomplete. 
 
The Court seems to justify the lack of a “necessity test” by implying that Article 5(1)(f) 
is less protective than Article 5(1)(c),147 according to which the authorities have to give 
reasonable motives on why the [criminal] detention is necessary in order to prevent a 
person from committing an offence or from fleeing after having done so. Thus, the Court 
uses a literal interpretation of Article 5(1)(f), which indeed does not require a necessity 
test. The use of the literal method of interpretation in this case may, however, be deemed 
unacceptable for several reasons. 
 
144 S.Z. v. Greece, §53; Kahadawa v. Cyprus, §58; Thimothawes v. Belgium, §60; S.M.M. v. UK., §67; J.N. 
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146 Bistieva and Others v. Poland, no. 75157/14, ECtHR 10 April 2018, §78. 
147 Kahadawa v. Cyprus, §58; Mahammad and Others v. Greece, §54. 
The right to liberty of asylum-seekers and the European Court of Human Rights in the aftermath of the 
2015 refugee crisis 
- 25 - DOI: 10.17103/reei.39.10 
Firstly, both the Refugee Convention and the ICCPR establish that the authorities have to 
carry out a necessity test prior to detaining asylum-seekers. While the former instrument 
explicitly states in Article 31(2) that restrictions on movement may only be applied if they 
are necessary,148 Article 9(1) ICCPR sets out that detention may not be “arbitrary”, a 
concept which, according to the HRC, includes elements of inappropriateness, 
reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.149 Therefore, the Court should follow a 
systematic interpretation of Article 5(1)(f) pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. As opposed to aforementioned dispute as to whether or not an asylum-seeker 
is lawfully in the territory of the State, in the case of requiring a necessity test there would 
be no need for the Court to draw on UNHCR guidelines or on the HRC case law. It is 
already crystal clear from the Refugee Convention that detention is only permissible when 
it is necessary. Even though the Court seemed to move towards a more systematic 
interpretation of Article 5(1)(f) in M.S.S. v. Belgium, where it reiterated the importance 
of State compliance with their international obligations when detaining asylum-
seekers,150 its jurisprudence after the refugee crisis does not reflect this line of thought.  
 
Secondly, the Court generally leaves a wide margin of appreciation to State Parties for 
justifying interferences of human rights only when no consensus in the law and practice 
of the State Parties on a particular issue can be found.151 However, the existence of a 
consensus that detention must be a last resort is visible throughout the European 
continent: in EU law,152 in resolutions of the Council of Europe153 and in national law of 
European States. As Dembour explains: 
 
This consensus has been expressed not only by NGOs and independent experts but also from 
within the ranks of political institutions; not only in distant lands but also from within Europe; 
not just by close majorities but also through processes which reflect a broad consensus; not in the 
distant past but very recently.154 
 
Thirdly, in cases related to other administrative detentions which do not explicitly require 
States to carry out a necessity test –i.e. paragraphs (b), (d) and (e) of Article 5− the Court 
clearly and systematically demands an individual motivation of the necessity with respect 
to each detention decision. This was underlined by Judges Karakas and Turkovic in their 
 
148 UNHCR has consistently warned States that the necessity requirement implies that they ought to look 
for alternatives to detention. For the most recent documents, see UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 57; and 
UNHCR, Beyond Detention, supra note 2.   
149 Human Rights Committee, supra note 61, §12. 
150 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, §216-218. This was reiterated in N.M. v. Romania, §5. 
151 FAHRAT, supra note 65, p. 317. 
152 See note 111. For a comparative study of practices on alternatives to detention in EU Member States, 
see DE BRUYCKER, P., BLOOMFIELD, A., TSOURDI, E. L. and PÉTIN, J., Alternatives to Immigration 
and Asylum Detention in the EU. Time for Implementation, Odysseus Network, 2014. Available at 
https://cutt.ly/drxfbpm. 
153 Committee of Ministers Recommendation R (2003) to member states on measures of detention of asylum 
seekers, adopted on 16 April 2003; Detention of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in Europe, 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1900 (2010), 28 January 2010. 
154 DEMBOUR, supra note 28, p. 383. 
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dissenting opinions to the judgment Thimothawes v. Belgium.155 Therefore the Court 
gives more leeway to States when detaining migrants and asylum-seekers in the context 
of migration control than when detaining other individuals, including those who have not 
complied with the lawful order of a court (Article 5(1)(b)).  
 
Finally, as noted by Cornelisse, the very nature of human rights requires that interferences 
with these rights be kept to a minimum. To accept that the right to liberty of migrants can 
be restricted –even when these restrictions are not necessary− fails to recognize that this 
right counts as a human right.156 A possible reason of why the Court affords such a 
substandard level of protection for detained migrants and asylum-seekers, Cornelisse 
states, is the Court’s perception of territorialised sovereignty as a natural and innocent 
concept and its portrayal of detention as a “necessary adjunct” to the sovereign State’s 
“undeniable right of control” over its territory.157 
 
Only taking into account the length of detention and not compelling States to carry out a 
necessity and balancing test can have very negative effects on the right to liberty of 
asylum-seekers, especially given the wide interpretation that the ECtHR has given to the 
grounds for detention under Article 5(1)(f). O’Nions gives the example of an asylum-
seeker who has been a victim of torture and trauma, and who is detained for “only” 7 to 
10 days. This would probably satisfy the “proportionality test” for the ECtHR (as it did 
in Saadi v. UK). However, since no alternatives to detention are sought and his particular 
circumstances are not taken into account, there is a significant possibility that this short-
term detention would have a severe detrimental effect on his welfare.158 
 
We began this section by referring to the Court´s statement that protecting the individual 
from arbitrary detention is the core purpose of Article 5 ECHR. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that this protection is not equally applied to all individuals. Immigrants and asylum-
seekers seem to have less of a right to liberty than others, since the proportionality test 
that States are required to perform in cases of the detention of migrants is much less 
substantive than in other cases.159 It is true that the deficiencies caused by this are partially 
covered by the use of the concept of “vulnerability”, as will be explored in section V. 
However, the Court’s use of the vulnerability concept is still on shaky ground, and, in any 





155 Dissenting Opinions of Judges Karakas and Turkovic, Thimothawes v. Belgium, no. 39061/11, ECtHR 
4 April 2017, §14-15. 
156 CORNELISSE, supra note 108, p. 227. 
157 CORNELISSE, supra note 95, p. 310. 
158 O’NIONS, supra note 34, p.181. 
159 Cornelisse has called the test employed by the ECtHR “proportionality lite”. See CORNELISSE, supra 
note 95, p. 296. 
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IV. THE DURATION OF DETENTION  
 
The length of detention is the main issue that preoccupies every detainee. “How long will 
I stay here?” is the first question that they ask at the detention centre. Lack of an exact 
time limit to detention leads to deep insecurity and anxiety.160 In its report on immigration 
detention in the United Kingdom, which is the only European country without a statutory 
general time limit on immigration detention, Amnesty International concludes that 
indefinite detention −whether or not the detainee suffers from pre-existing conditions or 
trauma− regularly results in serious and lasting harm, both to the detainee and the people 
close to them.161 One of the migrants interviewed by this organisation described her 
experience of indefinite detention as “emotional torture”162. It is reasonable to assume 
that, for traumatised asylum-seekers who, as mentioned above, suffer from an 
independent deterioration of their mental health caused by detention,163 the uncertainty 
of not knowing when that situation will end only exacerbates that trauma. 
 
Not only Amnesty International, but also UNHCR,164 the HRC165 and other 
organizations166 have called for the UK to adopt time limits for immigration detention. 
Yet despite the importance that the ECtHR gives to the duration of detention both in the 
safeguards under the second limb of Article 5(1)(f) and in the arbitrariness test, the Court 
has refused to read such limits into its interpretation of Article 5(1)(f), stressing that the 
lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty under this provision depends on the particular 
circumstances of each case.167 Therefore, in J.N. and Others and in S.M.M., the ECtHR 
failed to condemn this practice by the UK, stating that, because domestic law permits the 
detainee to challenge the lawfulness of the detention at any time, the absence of fixed 
time limits does not give rise to any increased risk of arbitrariness.168 Whether national 
law sets time limits or not is a factor that the Court might take into consideration in its 
assessment of the “quality of the law”, but this does not entail an obligation for States to 
establish a maximum period of immigration detention.169 This was restated in a later case 
against Belgium.170 
 
Due to the absence of time limits under Article 5(1)(f), the element of duration needs a 
case-by-case analysis so as to be able to foresee the possible outcome of a judgement in 
future cases. Following the Court’s interpretation of proportionality as a principle linked 
 
160 ILAREVA, supra note 8. 
161 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, A Matter of Routine: The Use of Immigration Detention in the UK, 
2017, p. 27. Available at: https://cutt.ly/grxljbg. 
162 Ibid, p. 21 
163 FILGES et al., supra note 7, p. 40. 
164 UNCHR, “UNHCR’s priorities for the UK Government”, 4-05-2017. Available at 
https://cutt.ly/FrxlkvV. 
165 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the on the seventh periodic report of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 17 August 2015 (CCPR/C/CO/7). 
166 LIBERTY, “Immigration Detention: Consensus for Change”, 2017. Available at https://cutt.ly/2rxllDY. 
167 J.N. v. UK, §83; A.E. v. Greece, §50; S.C. v. Romania, §57. 
168 J.N. v. UK, §97-98; S.M.M. v. UK, §70. 
169 J.N. v. UK, §90-93; S.M.M. v. UK, §70. 
170 K.G. v. Belgium, no. 52548/15, ECtHR 6 November 2018. 
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to the duration of detention, it has in some cases considered the duration “reasonable” or 
“not excessive” and, in others, “unreasonable”. 
The Court has found the following length of detention not to be “excessive”171: 
(1) In what the Court considered to be a “short period of time”: 5 to 7 days in an 
immigration detention centre.172 
(2) When an ordinary expulsion procedure was in progress, for the completion of 
administrative formalities: 3 months.173            
(3) In complex expulsion procedures that, in addition, required the processing of various 
asylum applications: 5 months.174 
(4) Following the application of an interim measure by the Court which suspended the 
expulsion procedure: 1 year.175 
(5) In the processing of the asylum claim filed by a detained migrant: 
a. When national law obliges authorities to process the asylum claim of a 
detainee “with absolute priority”: 1 and a half months.176  
b. When there is a risk that the detainee absconds, misusing the asylum 
procedure, and the conditions of detention are adapted for asylum-seekers: 5 
months.177 
c. When the detainee had been considered as an undesirable person by a national 
Court, which complicated the asylum application: 8 months178 and 1 year.179   
(6) After a decision to grant subsidiary protection has been issued and before the asylum-
seeker is notified of it: 3 days, which the Court considers reasonable due to the 
“practical implications arising from the need to notify the decision”.180 
(7) In the age assessment procedure of an asylum-seeker who turned out not to be a minor: 
8 months (although the Court expressed reservation about the duration of the 
procedure but still found the duration not to be unreasonable).181 
On the contrary, the Court has found the following duration of detention to be 
“unreasonable”182: 
(1) After it was clear that there was no realistic prospect of removal of the applicant but 
the detention continued: 21 days.183 
(2) In expulsion procedures:  
a. Where the applicant did not obstruct his deportation: 4 months.184 
 
171 S.C. v. Romania, §63. 
172 Kahadawa v. Cyprus, §63. 
173 R.T. v. Greece, §87; A.Y. v. Greece, §86. 
174 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §81. 
175 H.S. v. Cyprus, §314. 
176 E.A. v. Greece, §88. 
177 Nassr Allah v. Latvia, no. 66166/13, ECtHR 21 July 2015, §60. 
178 S.C. v. Romania, §63. 
179 N.M. v. Romania, §96. 
180 Nassr Allah v. Latvia, §58. 
181 Mahamed Jama v. Malta, §150. 
182 Thimothawes v. Belgium, §55. 
183 S.Z. v. Greece, §58. 
184 A.E. v. Greece, §54. 
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b. Where the applicant did not cooperate with his deportation but, at the same 
time, the authorities did not act with due diligence in the expulsion procedure: 
1 year.185 
c. After the Court lifted the interim measure which suspended the expulsion 
procedure but the applicants were kept in detention without an explanation 
from the Government: 23 days.186 
(3) In the assessment of an asylum application:  
a. 4 months, since this period breached national law, according to which the 
asylum application of a detained person should be considered an “absolute 
priority”.187  
b. 7 months and 12 days, in a case where, although complex due to the risk of 
absconding and the fact that the applicant was asking for more time to submit 
documents for his asylum claim, the authorities did not act with due diligence 
in processing the asylum application.188  
(4) After subsidiary protection was granted to the asylum-seeker and no justification was 
given by the Government for continuing the detention: 5 days.189 
(5) After the Government finally rejected the asylum application but did not start the 
expulsion procedure and gave no explanation for the extension of the detention 
period: 9 months190 and 3 months.191  
(6) In the age assessment procedure of two asylum-seekers who turned out to be minors: 
8 months (compare with number 7, above).192 
 
From this analysis we may conclude that the Court takes into account both the behaviour 
of the State and of the asylum applicant in order to determine whether or not the duration 
of detention is in breach of Article 5(1)(f). Nonetheless, the variety of situations and the 
difference in the assessment of the “reasonableness” of the duration of detention in each 
case by the Court –which, in some instances, even considers 1 year of detention to be 
reasonable− makes it difficult to draw a general trend from the case law. The approach in 
this sense therefore adds to the highly casuistic methodology of the Court in immigration 
cases, which Judge Martens referred to as “a lottery”.193  
 
It can be argued that refraining from setting a fixed time limit, despite the wide consensus 
among European States194 and international institutions, is another way of granting States 
 
185 J.N. v. UK, §108. 
186 H.S. v. Cyprus, §320. 
187 A.E. v. Greece, §52. 
188 S.M.M. v. UK, §77-88. 
189 Mahamed Jama v. Malta, §157. 
190 Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, §137-138. 
191 S.C. v. Romania, §64. 
192 Abdullahi Elmi v. Malta, §145-148. 
193 Dissenting opinion of Judge Martens in Boughanemi v. France, no. 22070/93, 24 April 1996. See 
DEMBOUR, supra note 28, p. 182. 
194 Apart from the fact that the UK is the only European State which does not set a time limit, EU law also 
provides for time limits in Article 43(2) APD, in Article 15(5) of the Return Directive and in Article 28(3) 
Dublin Regulation, which was interpreted by the CJEU in Khir Amayry v. Migrationsverket, C-60/16, 
EU:C:2017:675. It is however regrettable that EU law does not set any time limits when the detention of 
the asylum-seeker is carried out for the purposes of verifying his identity (Article 8(3)(a) RCD), 
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a wide margin of appreciation. This deference is all the more striking when considering 
that in Sh.D. and Others v. Greece, the Court itself recognised that not setting a maximum 
time limit in national law can lead to a “quite long” period of detention.195 Unfortunately, 
this risk does not seem sufficient for the Court to read the requirement of a fixed time 
limit into its interpretation of Article 5(1)(f). 
 
 
V. DETENTION OF VULNERABLE ASYLUM-SEEKERS: THE VULNERABILITY 
PUZZLE IN THE ECTHR’S JURISPRUDENCE 
 
When judges or legislators use the notion of vulnerability, they aim to provide a higher 
level of protection for a particular group or individual.196 In the context of the right to 
liberty under the ECHR, understanding the concept of vulnerability and its legal 
implications proves to be difficult, because there is no systematic interpretation of the 
concept by the Court. Consequently, when reading different judgements that relate to 
vulnerability, we might come to different conclusions. As noted by Heri, the Court often 
slips considerations of vulnerability into its judgments without further discussion.197 
Given that the impact of detention for vulnerable people may be proportionally higher 
than for others, and especially since there is no explicit prohibition of the detention of 
vulnerable individuals in any human rights regime,198 searching for clarification has 
become an important issue in recent works.199 In the framework of this study, the concept 
of vulnerability also needs to be analysed, for it might give an answer to the question that 
has already been hinted in section II(5): Does the application of this concept by the 
ECtHR compensate for the gaps that we have found in its jurisprudence? 
 
The concurring opinion of Judge Lemmens in the Thimothawes judgement may be of help 
as a starting point for answering this question. In this opinion, Lemmens interprets the 
recent jurisprudence of the Court regarding vulnerability and states that, when detaining 
migrants and asylum-seekers, authorities are required to implement a “vulnerability 
test”.200 This test −which we understand forms part of the “arbitrariness test”− is 
composed of three steps: 
 
 
determining the elements of the application for international protection (Article 8(3)(b) RCD) or protecting 
national security and public order (Article 8(3)(e) RCD). 
195 Sh.D. and Others v. Greece, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia, no. 
14165/16, ECtHR 13 June 2019, §69. 
196 PÉTIN, J., “Exploring the Role of Vulnerability in Immigration Detention”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 
n. 35, 2016, pp. 91-108, p. 92. 
197 HERI, C., “The Responsiveness of a Positive State – Vulnerability and Positive Obligations under the 
ECHR”, Strasbourg Observers [blog], 13-10-2016. Available at: https://cutt.ly/LrlBo1b. 
198 PÉTIN, supra note 196, p. 99. 
199 See, for instance, BRANDL, U. and CZECH, P., “General and Specific Vulnerability of Protection-
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1) Detect whether the immigrant presents a particular vulnerability that opposes 
detention. If that is the case, steps 2 and 3 must be implemented. 
2) Assess the individual needs of the vulnerable person. 
3) Search for the possibility of applying a less radical measure. 
 
If these steps are not followed, then the detention of the vulnerable person could raise an 
issue under Article 5(1)(f).201 When reading this, we might think that the Court finally 
recognises that States have carry out a necessity test when detaining migrants and asylum-
seekers, that is to say, that States are obliged to look for alternatives to detention.  
 
However, this optimism vanishes when analysing the nuances of the “vulnerability test”. 
First, looking for an alternative measure of detention only becomes a requirement when 
a particular vulnerability of the asylum-seeker is detected, which is not the case in all 
instances of detention. The meaning of this concept will be explained below. Second, 
even if the State does not put into practice any of the three steps of the “vulnerability 
test”, the consequence is not a blatant breach of Article 5(1)(f): it merely “could raise an 
issue” under that Article. Similarly to the case of the interaction between the ECHR and 
EU law (section III(2)), the use of this ambiguous expression might give leeway to States 
to not take into account the vulnerability of the applicant and yet still lawfully detain an 
asylum-seeker under Article 5(1)(f). 
 
Nevertheless, even a necessity test in cases where a particular vulnerability is detected is 
a move forward from the absolute “no-necessity test” approach. As pointed out by 
Ventury,202 vulnerability can serve to reinforce an asylum-seeker´s procedural and 
substantial rights, in particular by limiting State´s arbitrariness. Moreover, according to 
Heri,203 the concept has the potential to raise the standard of protection afforded to 
applicants because it imposes a positive obligation on the State to conduct an 
individualized assessment once vulnerability is detected. An example of this positive 
obligation can be found in Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, a case about the detention of an 
asylum-seeker with health problems. Although national law did not exempt vulnerable 
individuals from detention, the Court declared the detention to be arbitrary because the 
Government had not taken any active steps to detect such vulnerable detainees and had 
excessively delayed the applicant’s vulnerability assessment procedure.204 
 
However, even if there is a positive obligation under the ECHR to carry out an individual 
“vunerability assessment” (which is not one hundred percent clear, as the opinion of 
Judge Lemmens shows), the positive impact of this obligation on asylum-seekers´ rights 
seems to be undermined by the fact that the Court requires them to prove their particular 
vulnerability when challenging the lawfulness of a detention before the ECtHR. Indeed, 
in Thimothawes v. Belgium, the Court stated that the asylum-seeker “has to establish that 
he was in a situation which could prima facie lead to the conclusion that his detention is 
 
201 Ibid.  
202 VENTURI, D., “The potential of a vulnerability-based approach: some additional reflections following 
O.M. v. Hungary”, Strasbourg Observers [blog], 25-10-2016. Available at https://cutt.ly/trlBVju. 
203 HERI , supra note 197. 
204 Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, §130-136. 
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not justified”.205 This conclusion is rather unfortunate, and we agree with Wissing in his 
argument that it should be for the State to reason why a less coercive measure could not 
be effective in an individual case and not for the asylum-seeker himself to prove why an 
alternative measure would be more suited to his situation.206 
 
In the 2016 case O.M. v. Hungary the Court seemed to be lowering that threshold of 
proof,207 since it required States to especially protect asylum-seekers who “claim to be a 
part of a vulnerable group”.208 However, the later judgement Thimothawes, from 2017, 
shows that the Court has not moved from its earlier position requiring asylum-seekers to 
prove their vulnerability. Taking these two judgements together, we may draw the 
following hypothesis: when the asylum-seeker has fled his country of origin because of 
his vulnerability (as was the case in O.M., where the person had fled his country because 
of his sexual orientation), he doesn’t have to prove that he belongs to that vulnerable 
group; but if that is not the case (like in Thimothawes), then the burden of proof falls on 
the asylum-seeker. Nevertheless, this hypothesis should be taken with caution since, as 
advanced at the beginning of this section, the Court’s jurisprudence regarding 
vulnerability is not consistent and it could be that in future cases the Court requires an 
asylum-seeker in a similar condition as O.M. to prove his vulnerability. 
 
Examples of cases where the Court has asked asylum-seekers to prove their vulnerability 
can be found in Thimothawes itself, in which the Court established that the asylum-seeker 
had not proved why his mental health lead to the conclusion that he could not be 
detained.209 Similarly, in S.M.M. v. UK the Court found that the national courts had 
already assessed that the mental illness of the asylum-seeker could be satisfactorily 
managed within detention, and that the applicant had not established any reasons why a 
divergence of this assessment would be required.210 A final example is the case of 
underage asylum-seekers, who have to prove their vulnerability as minors by letting the 
State determine their age through an age-assessment procedure, which may also involve 
detention, as will be discussed below. 
 
Turning now to the central question of when does a migrant or asylum-seeker present a 
“particular vulnerability that opposes detention” for the purposes of the vulnerability test, 
once again the answer is not straightforward. In its widely acclaimed211 2011 judgement 
M.S.S., the Court held that all asylum-seekers are a “particularly underprivileged and 
vulnerable population group in need of special protection (…) because of everything they 
have been through during their migration and the traumatic experiences they are likely to 
have endured previously”.212 Despite this reference to past experiences, it must be 
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underlined that, for the ECtHR, vulnerability is not derived from an applicant´s individual 
personal circumstances, but rather from his affiliation to a group with special needs.213 
 
This group-centred approach to vulnerability is made clear by the Grand Chamber in the 
case Khlaifia and Others v. Italy. While the Chamber of the ECtHR considered irregular 
migrants to be particularly vulnerable because they had undergone a “dangerous journey 
on the high seas”;214 this argument was later dismissed by the Grand Chamber, which 
observed that the applicants were not asylum-seekers and, therefore, they “did not have 
the specific vulnerability inherent in that status”.215 This move has been described as a 
“step back” from the Chamber´s protection of irregular migrants.216 
 
Following the reasoning developed in M.S.S. and Khlaifia, therefore, it seems clear that 
the mere fact of applying for asylum triggers the obligation of the authorities to implement 
steps (2) and (3) of the “vulnerability assessment” before placing the asylum-seeker under 
arrest. However, the analysis becomes more complicated when we add Abdullahi Elmi v. 
Malta and O.M. v. Hungary into the picture. In these judgements, the Court finds that, in 
addition to their status as asylum-seekers, the applicants were even more vulnerable than 
other asylum-seekers because they were minors (in Abdullahi) and because they belonged 
to the LGBTI community (in O.M.).217 Although this distinction between a more general 
and a more specific vulnerability might seem confusing, Venturi argued that this is a 
positive step, because by taking a nuanced, flexible and layered approach to the concept, 
the Court acknowledges specifically the risks of a double vulnerability: as an asylum-
seeker and as a member of another extremely vulnerable group218.  
 
We would also endorse this view if it weren’t for the fact that, in other judgements like 
Mahamed Jama,219 S.M.M. v. UK. and Thimothawes, the fact that the asylum-seeker 
lacked (or could not prove) a double vulnerability meant that the “vulnerability test” was 
no longer required by the Court. Therefore, the general vulnerability of all asylum-seekers 
has been effectively emptied of meaning, and we can thus affirm that, as of 2020, only 
the vulnerability of certain asylum-seekers triggers the obligation of authorities to carry 
out a “vulnerability test” when restricting their right to liberty. As warned by Brandl and 
Czech, the concept of the vulnerability of asylum-seekers allows us to distinguish various 
grades of vulnerability derived from the personal circumstances of the individual 
concerned, so long as the general state of vulnerability is sufficiently respected  [emphasis 
added].220 However, in view of the developments presented above, it can hardly be 
maintained that the Court respects the general state of vulnerability of asylum-seekers in 
its recent judgments. 
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So which groups of asylum-seekers does the Court now find vulnerable in the sense of 
triggering the “vulnerability test”? In its recent case law, one clear group stands out: 
unaccompanied and accompanied minors. The second most common group are those with 
a deteriorated psychological and/or physical state of health, although in the cases analysed 
the state of health has a greater impact on the Court’s assessment of the conditions of 
detention under Article 3 than on that of Article 5(1)(f). Thirdly, since O.M. v. Hungary, 
LGBTI asylum-seekers are now also considered exceptionally vulnerable.  
 
Special reference will now be made to the first group. The obligation to only detain 
children in an immigration context as a measure of last resort when no alternative is 
available was first laid down in Rahimi v. Greece in 2011.221 To come to this conclusion, 
the Court especially draws on Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child,222 which requires States to take into account the best interests of the child 
when taking decisions that concern minors.223 
 
The strong liberty-protective approach that the Court takes when assessing cases of 
detained minors in search for asylum can be observed in different judgements of recent 
years. For instance, in what has been termed an “uncharacteristically damning 
language”,224 the Court has stated in Abdullahi Elmi v. Malta that if the authorities delay 
the release of children after having established that they are in fact underage, this raises 
“serious doubts as to the authorities’ good faith”.225 Similarly, in Mahamed Jama v. 
Malta, the Court did not accept the Government’s argument that an extremely long 
detention period could be justified purely because the age assessment procedure in cases 
of persons close to adulthood is lengthier.226 
 
However, the fact that in both judgements the Court appears to tacitly endorse the idea 
that States can detain asylum-seekers pending the result of an age determination process 
has been criticized by Rooney. She finds this kind of detention difficult to reconcile with 
the established principle of international law (recognized by the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child)227 that children should be given the benefit of the 
doubt in administrative proceedings.228 
 
As a final example, in Bistieva and Others v. Poland the Court has pointed out that the 
protection of the child´s best interests involves keeping the family together.229 This takes 
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us to a collateral issue to the right to liberty of minors: the right to family life (Article 8 
ECHR). While a core element of this right is the mutual enjoyment by parent and child 
of each other’s company, if detention is prolonged, then the Court has found a violation 
of Article 8 even when the family unity was maintained.230 In any case, the detention of 
families accompanied by children has to be limited as far as possible by all necessary 
means.231 
 
With regard to asylum-seekers with a deteriorated state of health, the Court first 
recognized them as vulnerable (and thus required authorities to carry out the 
“vulnerability test”) in the 2011 judgement Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium.232 It has 
continued to recognise them as such in more recent years.233 Some authors hoped that this 
judgement would mean a move away from Saadi and Chahal and that, in the future, the 
Court would require authorities to implement a necessity test in all asylum and migration 
detention cases.234 However, as this study has shown, this has not been the case. 
 
Finally, regarding LGBTI asylum-seekers, which is the most recent group that has been 
recognized as vulnerable, the Court grounded their vulnerability on the fact that they may 
be unsafe in custody among other detained persons who come from countries with 
widespread cultural or religious prejudice against such persons.235 
 
 
VI. DETENTION IS DETENTION NO MORE: ILIAS AND AHMED V. HUNGARY 
(GRAND CHAMBER) 
 
More recently, in November 2019, the Grand Chamber rendered the judgment Ilias and 
Ahmed v. Hungary,236 which overturned the Chamber judgment with regard to Article 
5(1)(f). The case concerned two asylum-seekers in Hungary who were required by 
Hungarian law to stay in a “transit zone” at the border with Serbia for 23 days while they 
awaited the outcome of their asylum application. The legal issue at stake was not only 
whether Article 5(1)(f) had been complied with, but the more fundamental issue of 
whether the confinement in the “transit zones” –a closed, fenced and heavily guarded 
container complex237− could be categorised as a deprivation of liberty within the meaning 
of Article 5. While analysing the distinction between restriction on freedom of movement 
and deprivation of liberty is beyond the scope of this study, this judgment is relevant to 
our analysis because it represents a new type of deference to State sovereignty: finding 
that there has been no detention at all.  
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It is true that asylum-seekers in Hungarian transit zones are able to leave the transit zone, 
but only in the direction from which they came, i.e. Serbia, a country which denies their 
right to (re)apply for asylum238 and where there is, therefore, a risk of chain 
refoulement.239 Since, according to Hungarian law, an asylum-seeker who leaves 
Hungarian territory will have his asylum application terminated, the Chamber rightly 
affirmed that declaring Article 5 inapplicable would “compel the applicants to choose 
between liberty and the pursuit of a procedure ultimately aimed to shelter them from the 
risk of exposure to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention”.240 Yet this is 
exactly what the Grand Chamber did by finding that the applicants were not deprived of 
their liberty,241 once again ignoring the view of UNHCR in an issue related to asylum 
detention.242 
 
The Grand Chamber thus effected an unfortunate reversal of the Chamber’s “milestone 
judgment”243 which some authors had considered unlikely “in light of the Court’s 
consistent jurisprudence”.244 However, the judgment is full of inconsistencies which have 
been pointed out by the partly dissenting opinion of two judges and by the legal 
commentator Stoyanova.245 Building on these critiques, we will highlight three elements 
of the judgment which most clearly reinforce the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. 
 
Firstly, the Strasbourg reversal246 has been expanded since, in addition to the right to 
control their borders, the Court has included a State’s right to “prevent foreigners 
circumventing restrictions on immigration”.247 While focusing on the prerogatives of the 
State, the right to seek asylum was given less emphasis by the Grand Chamber, as it found 
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that the applicants had stayed in the transit zones voluntarily,248 thus disregarding the fact 
that seeking asylum is “a necessity, not a choice”.249 Interestingly, it appears that the 
Grand Chamber acknowledged the Strasbourg reversal when it declared that “the starting 
point regarding the applicants’ individual position vis-à-vis the authorities is entirely 
different”.250 Indeed, the Strasbourg reversal means exactly this: having a “different” 
starting point, namely State sovereignty instead of human rights. 
 
Secondly, in order to find that there had been no deprivation of liberty, the Grand 
Chamber did not only take account of the fact that Hungarian law did not designate the 
transit zone as a detention centre,251 but also of the fact that the authorities were 
“convinced” that the applicants could  leave in the direction of Serbia.252 Giving such 
weight to the authorities’ assessment of the situation is, without doubt, a sign of widening 
the margin of appreciation, which “turns the clock back many years on the interpretation 
of Article 5”.253 
 
Thirdly, the Grand Chamber affirmed that in drawing the distinction between detention 
and restriction on liberty of movement, “its approach should be practical and realistic, 
having regard to the present-day conditions and challenges”.254 This sentence begs the 
question as to whether the Grand Chamber was referring to the “challenges” faced by 
Hungary or to those faced by the Court itself. In effect, the Chamber judgment Ilias and 
Ahmed had sparked stark criticism from the Hungarian Government, which asserted that 
the Court’s decision was “unenforceable” because it did not respect Hungary’s 
sovereignty.255 An even greater threat for the Court were the voices being raised by pro-
government members of the Hungarian parliament −amongst other national institutions− 
according to which, in response to Ilias and Ahmed, Hungary should withdraw from the 
ECHR.256  
 
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that these political pressures lead the Court to 
adopt a “realistic” approach which, in practice, meant levelling down the previous 
judgment so as to maintain Hungary’s trust in the European human rights system. To do 
this, the Court almost seemed to praise the Hungarian Government for having processed 
the applicant’s claims so fast257 even though it was dealing with what was “clearly a crisis 
situation”.258 Taking into account the context of the European refugee crisis as a way to 
justify a lower human rights protection is something that the Court has done not only with 
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respect to Article 5 but, more worryingly, to the Convention provision which embodies 
the “fundamental values of a democratic society”: Article 3. 
 
 
VII. CONDITIONS OF DETENTION UNDER ARTICLE 3 AFTER THE REFUGEE 
CRISIS 
 
While the ECHR is the only human rights treaty that does not enshrine a specific provision 
on detention conditions,259 the ECtHR offers similar protection to migrants and asylum-
seeker by applying Article 3 of the Convention,260 according to which “no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Moreover, if 
the detention conditions do not fall under the threshold of Article 3 but are still not 
adequate, they may be fail to meet condition number (3) of the “arbitrariness test” and 
thus be in breach Article 5, as shown above.261 
 
Due to the absolute nature of the prohibition under Article 3,262 the margin of appreciation 
as regards detention conditions plays a much less important role than with regard to the 
right to liberty. However, three of the judgments analysed demonstrate signs that the 
deference to States after the 2015 refugee crisis has partly reached the case law on 
detention conditions.  
 
In the first place, what leads us to this tentative conclusion is the Court’s consideration in 
these judgments of States’ difficulties in managing a migration crisis. The first time the 
ECtHR referred to this issue was in 2011, in the case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, where 
it recognized that States which form the external borders of the European Union were 
experiencing considerable difficulties in coping with the increasing influx of migrants 
and asylum-seekers, but nevertheless stated that, in view of the absolute nature of Article 
3 ECHR, these difficulties could not absolve a State of its obligation under that provision. 
Therefore, the Court would not take into account these objective difficulties when 
assessing whether or not there had been a violation of Article 3.263 The same argument 
was made by the Court in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy in the same year.264 
 
Five years later, the Grand Chamber issued the landmark judgement Khlaifia and Others 
v. Italy, which related, among other issues, to the detention of migrants in Lampedusa in 
2011 in the context of the post-Arab Spring influx of migrants to Europe. While this 
judgement strengthened migrants’ and asylum-seekers’ rights under Article 5 (as shown 
above), its interpretation of Article 3 regarding detention conditions signalled a step 
backwards with respect to the principles established in its previous judgements.265 In this 
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case, the Court bent somewhat the argument made in M.S.S. and Hirsi, and stated that 
“while constraints inherent in a migration crisis cannot, in themselves, be used to justify 
a breach of Article 3, it would be artificial to examine the facts of the case without 
considering the general context in which those facts arose”.266 Therefore, the Court would 
“bear in mind, together with other factors (…) the situation of extreme difficulty 
confronting the Italian authorities”.267 
 
Although the Court did indeed take into account other factors in order to rule that there 
had been no violation of Article 3, in the words of Goldenziel, “the willingness of the 
Court to consider the context of a migration crisis erodes the absolute character of the 
prohibition within Article 3”.268 His criticism is in line with that of other authors. Venturi 
casts doubts as to whether the mass arrivals were really impossible to predict and, thus, 
likely to preclude a proper organization;269 while Zirulia and Peers suggest that the Court 
should have taken into account that the unlawful deprivation of liberty inflicted by the 
Italian government in violation of Article 5 had contributed to aggravating the 
consequences of the humanitarian emergency.270 Goldenziel goes further and states that 
“the Court could have easily declared that Italy was liable for violating Article 3 citing 
specific actions that the State could have taken to avoid [the situation of extreme 
difficulty]”.271  
 
A parallel conclusion to that of Khlaifia and Others was reached by the Court in the 2017 
case J.R. and Others v. Greece, a case concerning the detention of asylum-seekers who 
had crossed the Aegean Sea from Turkey to the Greek island of Chios in 2016. In this 
judgement, the Court took into account that the detentions of the asylum-seekers occurred 
at a time when there was an exceptional and sudden increase in migratory flows, which 
had created organisational, logistical and structural difficulties in the small island of 
Chios.272 Although the fact that the Court declared that the situation in Chios was 
“chaotic” can be regarded as a wakeup call from the Court to the EU and Greece,273 it is 
worrying that the Court, once again, seemed to raise the threshold of severity required 
under Article 3 in situations where the State is faced with a migration crisis. 
 
J.R. and Others takes us to the second reason leading us to the conclusion that the Court 
defers to the judgment of States regarding the detention conditions of asylum-seekers. As 
in Khlaifia and Others, in J.R. the Court did not limit itself to taking into account the 
critical situation in Chios and laid down further arguments to declare that there had been 
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no violation of Article 3. In our view, however, these other arguments are not well-
justified. First, the Court found that the problems denounced by the report of the CPT 
“were not such as to amount to a breach of Article 3”.274 This conclusion is surprising, 
since the CPT’s report drew attention on elements of the conditions of detention which, 
in other judgements, the Court had taken into account in order to declare a violation of 
Article 3: overcrowding,275 inadequate quality of both the food and the water276 and lack 
of medical care.277 This finding is all the more troubling given that one of the applicant’s 
was mentally ill, to the extent that she tried to commit suicide in two occasions. 
 
The Court also seems to ignore the findings of the other third parties which again describe 
circumstances of the conditions of detention that, taken cumulatively, could breach 
Article 3: little outdoor space, rudimentary hygiene conditions, insufficient meals and 
lack of protection against the cold at night, with some people having to sleep on the floor. 
In any case, even if these conditions did not amount to a violation of Article 3, the Court 
should have at least discussed these findings by these parties and justified why they did 
not exceed the minimum threshold of severity of the ill-treatment. J.R. and Others −and 
the later judgments which refer to it, O.S.A. and Others and Kaak and Others v. Greece− 
thus confirm Dembour’s criticism that “most often the finding that the minimum level of 
severity required to engage Article 3 is not reached is left unreasoned”.278 Moreover, the 
ECtHR noted that the duration of detention of the asylum-seekers was “characterized by 
its brevity”, which added to the finding that there had been no ill-treatment.279 Although 
this argument was reasonable in the case of Khlaifia and Others, where the migrants only 
spend three days in detention, the same cannot be said of J.R. and Others, where the 
asylum-seekers spent one month in the conditions described above. 
 
Finally, the third ground for our argument is that, as in the case of Article 5(1)(f), the 
Court has downplayed the significance of the general vulnerability of asylum-seekers in 
both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber judgment Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, where 
the Court found that “while it is true that asylum-seekers are considered particularly 
vulnerable (…), the applicants in the present case were not more vulnerable than any other 
adult asylum-seeker detained at the time”.280 Therefore, States do no longer have an 
obligation under Article 3 ECHR to assess the particular needs of a detainee –and to adapt 
the detention conditions to those needs– merely because he is an asylum-seeker. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The hardships faced by the millions of refugees who have reached European soil since 
2015 have only been exacerbated by the “odd detention practices”281 introduced by States. 
However, this situation does not seem to have changed the ECtHR’s jurisprudence set in 
Saadi and Chahal towards a more liberty-protective approach to the detention of asylum-
seekers. If anything, it has reinforced the “reversal of the presumption in favor of liberty”, 
as Moreno-Lax puts it.282 This study has shown that the Strasbourg reversal, whereby the 
Court takes a deferential approach to State sovereignty in migration-related case law,283 
has also been applied by the Court in its case law on asylum detention; and that such an 
approach has been particularly strengthened in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis. 
We have argued this based on the following reasons: 
 
a) Asylum-seekers are still regarded by the Court as “unautho 
rized entrants”, following its jurisprudence established in the leading case Saadi. Neither 
the numerous critiques that the Court received over this finding nor the fact that it 
contradicts both the UNHCR Guidelines on detention and the case law of the HRC appear 
to have had an impact on the Court´s reasoning. Asylum-seekers who reach EU Member 
States are more likely to escape this comparison with irregular migrants when filing an 
application before the ECtHR, since EU law does generally not regard asylum-seekers as 
unlawfully staying migrants. Even in these cases, however, the Court´s ambiguous 
wording in Suso Musa v. Malta and O.M. v. Hungary does not categorically forbid EU 
Member States from detaining asylum-seekers merely in order to “prevent their 
unauthorized entry” under the first limb of Article 5(1)(f). 
 
b) While in the 2011 cases S.D. v. Greece and R.U. v. Greece it appeared that the Court 
was moving away from the Chahal jurisprudence in forbidding the State from detaining 
an asylum-seeker “in view of his expulsion”, the 2016 case Nabil and Others v. Hungary 
has clearly shown that the Court only rejects this kind of detention when it is found to be 
in violation of national law. According to this judgment, the Convention itself allows for 
an asylum-seeker to be detained for pre-deportation purposes without any requirements 
concerning the individual behavior of the applicant, which, as we have argued, is at odds 
with human rights law and with the Court’s own interpretation of the second limb of 
Article 5(1)(f). The harsh assertion made by the Court in Nabil has certainly not gone 
unnoticed, since the CJEU referred to it in J.N. v. Staatssecretaris when interpreting 
Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,284 the EU 
equivalent of Article 5 EHCR.285 
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c) The Court has continued the practice of not requiring States to apply a full 
proportionality test when detaining migrants and asylum-seekers, thus offering a lower 
level of protection than the Refugee Convention and the ICCPR. In these cases, States are 
not required under the ECHR to carry out a necessity test and (often) a balancing test, two 
of the essential elements of the proportionality principle. Instead, the Court has 
constructed an arbitrariness test which very much relies on the duration of detention in 
order to determine whether or not a detention is arbitrary. This is a cause for concern 
since, if the requirements of necessity and balancing are not strictly applied, States might 
be encouraged to extend the use of asylum detention as they do not need to look for 
alternatives.286 Moreover, the safeguards related to the duration of the detention are not 
the most adequate when assessing compliance with the principle of legal certainty, as the 
Court has refused from setting a maximum period of detention permitted under the ECHR 
and it is difficult to foresee which duration will be considered lawful by the Court. 
 
d) The more liberty-protective steps taken by the Court in the 2011 judgment M.S.S. v. 
Belgium have been diluted in the post-2015 judgments, especially in Thimothawes v. 
Belgium. While in M.S.S. the Court acknowledged that all asylum-seekers are vulnerable 
individuals and that, as such, a vulnerability test has to be carried out by States; after the 
refugee crisis the Court has emptied this general vulnerability of asylum-seekers of 
meaning, since it has only required States to carry out this test when the asylum-seeker 
was part of a more specific vulnerable group. Moreover, these groups of asylum-seekers 
have to prove that they are vulnerable in order for the vulnerability test to be triggered. 
This is particularly troublesome in the case of minors, who can then be detained pending 
the result of an age determination procedure −a measure at once at odds with the principle 
of giving children the benefit of the doubt. 
 
e) In the Grand Chamber judgment Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, the ECtHR found a novel 
way to grant deference to State’s sovereignty in asylum detention cases; by declaring that 
the confinement of asylum-seekers in the Hungarian transit zone does not amount to a 
deprivation of liberty and, thus, that Article 5 ECHR is not applicable at all. Besides the 
inconsistencies of the judgment, the reasoning of the Court shows several signs of an 
attempt to pacify the Hungarian State by taking a “realistic” approach. This approach 
gives great weight both to the Government’s arguments and to the alleged difficulties that 
the State was facing in coping with the mass influx of migrants. 
 
f) With regard to the detention conditions under Article 3, a State-protective change in 
the jurisprudence of the Court has been found with respect to the element of “State´s 
difficulties in managing a migration crisis”. While in M.S.S. and Hirsi Jamaa the Court 
refused to take into account this element when assessing whether or not there had been a 
breach of Article 3, after 2015 the Court raised the threshold required for a violation of 
this provision when the State is faced with a migration crisis. This can be seen from the 
judgments delivered in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy and in J.R. and Others v. Greece. 
Moreover, in order to declare that there was no violation of Article 3 in the latter 
judgment, the Court failed to discuss the evidence presented to it regarding the deplorable 
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conditions in the Greek hotspots. Finally, blurring the significance of the vulnerability of 
asylum-seekers under Article 3 may also be a form of granting more power to States as it 
weakens their responsibility to adapt detention conditions to their needs. 
 
We may now answer the two research questions posed by this study: 
 
1) Does the ECtHR approach the cases of detention of asylum-seekers with self-
restraint, in line with other migration-related cases?  
Yes, it clearly does. The deference to State’s sovereignty is especially visible in the 
Court´s interpretation of Article 5(1)(f), which gives more leeway to States to detain 
migrants and asylum-seekers than in other detention cases and offers a lower protection 
than both EU law and other international human rights instruments by allowing the 
detention of asylum-seekers for “administrative convenience”. 
 
2) Have political tensions after the 2015 refugee crisis have in any way affected the 
Court´s judicial approach towards the detention of asylum-seekers?  
 
We do not find a radical change in the Court´s case law, since the Court was already 
deferential to State´s sovereignty in asylum detention cases before the refugee crisis. 
Nonetheless, this deferential approach has in some cases been made clearer (e.g. in Nabil) 
and in other cases even further expanded (e.g. in Thimothawes, Khlaifia, J.R. and Others 
and in the Grand Chamber judgment Ilias and Ahmed). Therefore, we can tentatively 
conclude that European State´s renewed preoccupation with strengthening their borders 
after 2015 has led the Court to widen the scope of the margin of appreciation and to be 
more lenient towards the practice of asylum detention when interpreting Article 5(1)(f) 
and, to a lesser extent, Article 3 ECHR.287 
 
This trend goes in line with the reaction that the Court has had regarding the interpretation 
of the Convention after the reform process of the European human rights system initiated 
in 2010 in Interlaken (Swizterland). Throughout this on-going process, which includes 
the adoption of the Brighton Declaration in 2012, the Brussels Declaration in 2015 and 
the Copenhagen Declaration in 2018,288 the 47 Council of Europe Member States have 
sent a clear political signal to the ECtHR stating their wish to rationalize the Court´s role 
 
287 This partly contradicts the finding of DRINÓCZI and MOHAY, who argue that, while the 2015 crisis 
has lead European States to adopt a less human rights-centred approach towards migration, at the level of 
human rights institutions we have not seen a change in trend. Yet these authors only take into account the 
Chamber judgment Ilias and Ahmed, which has now been overturned as regards Article 5, and do not 
analyse other judgments which do show such a change in trend in the ECtHR, at least in respect to asylum 
detention. See DRINÓCZI and MOHAY, supra note 244, p. 109. 
288 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration. 
Council of Europe, 19 and 20 April 2012; High Level Conference on the “Implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, our shared responsibility”, Brussels Declaration. Council of Europe, 27 
March 2015; High Level Conference meeting in Copenhagen at the initiative of the Danish Chairmanship 
of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Copenhagen Declaration. Council of Europe, 12 
and 13 April 2018. 
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in the protection of human rights and to enhance the position of the States.289 The legal 
outputs of this process –and in particular of the Brighton Declaration- have been the 
adoption of Protocol 15 and Protocol 16 to the ECHR which, among others, reinforce the 
subsidiarity principle and introduce further obstacles in the filing of applications to the 
Court.290  
 
As Madsen shows in his empirical study comparing the case law of the Court before and 
after the Brighton Declaration, the ECtHR has responded to this political message by 
providing more subsidiarity in cases of Article 8 ECHR (right to privacy), Article 35 
(access to court) and Article 3.291 The same can be said generally for migration-related 
cases, where the Court has often retracted from earlier more human rights protective 
pronouncements in response to the attack by States.292 As we have seen, in the area of 
asylum detention the Court has also retracted from or changed the course of more liberty-
protective cases like M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, R.U. v. Greece and S.D. v. Greece. 
Therefore, the Court´s tendency to be more deferential to State´s sovereignty in recent 
years is not an exclusive feature of its asylum detention case law.  
 
Admittedly, the ECtHR emphasizes the domestic protection of rights, as shown by the 
many cases in which the Court refers to domestic law in order to assess the compatibility 
of the asylum detention with Article 5 ECHR. However, it should not be forgotten that 
compliance with international law is also a criterion set by the Court to determine the 
lawfulness of the detention. Yet, by not upholding the standards set by the Refugee 
Convention and the ICCPR, the Court takes this requirement less seriously than the 
national law criteria. With regard to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Noll has noted that, 
due to the difference between contemporary migratory realities and those of the drafting 
period of the Refugee Convention, Article 31 –the article referring to the detention of 
asylum-seekers– is not applied in a straightforward manner.293 It is certainly regrettable 
to observe that, not only do States fail to apply this article in a consistent way, so too does 
an international human rights court with a long tradition of defending individuals. 
 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Costello, without a clear ECtHR review of the purposes 
and necessity of detention, domestic law and rule of law criteria may offer little protection 
in practice.294 Taking national law as the main parameter for assessing compatibility with 
Article 5 ECHR may offer sufficient protection in States whose national law fully 
transposes the EU asylum acquis –which, for the most part, makes up for the 
shortcomings of the ECtHR’s case law– or in States that apply equivalent standards (i.e. 
Denmark and Ireland). But certain EU Member States either transpose EU law belatedly 
 
289 MADSEN, supra note 25; LAMBRECHT, S., “Undue political pressure is not dialogue: The draft 
Copenhagen Declaration and its potential repercussions on the Court´s independence” Strasbourg 
Observers [blog], 2-3-2018. Available at: https://cutt.ly/9rlBvRt. 
290 Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 24 June 2013 (CETS, No. 213); Protocol No. 16 to the Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2 November 2013 (CETS, No. 214).  
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–such as Greece, where the RCD was transposed three years after the transposition 
deadline set by the Directive295– or even actively pursue to disobey EU law, as is the case 
of Hungary.296 In addition, after Brexit the United Kingdom will stop being bound by the 
first generation of the EU asylum acquis and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
the country’s standards of immigration detention fall short of offering the high protection 
of EU law.297 The self-restraint of the ECtHR is even more problematic in the case of the 
European non-EU States where EU law does not offer an additional protection to detained 
asylum-seekers. For instance, Turkish law allows for detention for the purposes of 
assessing an asylum application on the merits,298 something completely forbidden under 
EU law.  
 
In any case, a full protection of the right to liberty of asylum-seekers by the ECtHR should 
not be made dependent on the standards set by EU law, let alone by national law. If the 
Court is to live up to its role as a promulgator of human rights standards in the European 
continent, it should at the very least uphold the international standards that are already in 
place. At a time when the foundations of European law, such as the liberal character of 
all EU Member States and the presumption of law-abidingness, are under strain,299 this 
seems as important as ever. 
 
As a final remark, we would like to add that the criticism made in this study does not 
purport to undermine the relevance of the ECtHR for the protection of asylum-seekers. 
On the contrary, by systematizing the many different legal issues on which the Court 
elaborates in its recent case law, we have shown that the Court has developed a rich 
jurisprudence which is of great value when national courts do not properly effect their 
function of defending the right to liberty of asylum-seekers. Our intention was rather to 
offer constructive criticism by highlighting the elements of the Court´s case law where 
we believe there is still room for improvement. In our view, providing the highest possible 
standard of protection to detained asylum-seekers should be a priority for the Court when 
dealing with these cases. As noted by several authors, the protection of migrants is a 
central function of international human rights, since they do not claim protection as 
members of a family, clan or nation but as members of humanity, and are thus more likely 
to see their rights violated by States.300 Detention is never a solution to the movements of 
refugees and asylum-seekers,301 and the Court should make this clearer.  
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We will conclude this study by quoting the vibrant words of the dissenting opinion of 
several judges in the Saadi case, which very much sum up the main idea that we have 
tried to convey in this study: 
 
Are we now also to accept that Article 5 ECHR, which has played a major role in ensuring controls 
of arbitrary detention, should afford a lower level of protection as regards asylum and immigration 
which, in social and human terms, are the most crucial issues facing us in the years to come? Is it 
a crime to be a foreigner? We do not think so.302 
 
302 Saadi v. UK, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Kovler, Hajiyev, Spielmann, and Hirvelä, 
§35. 
